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Article 
The Great Collapse:  
How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown  
KURT EGGERT 
This Article argues that one of the primary causes of the subprime 
meltdown and the resulting economic collapse was the structure of 
securitization as applied to subprime and other non-prime residential 
loans, along with the resecuritization of the resulting mortgage-backed 
securities.  Securitization weakened underwriting by discouraging 
originators from gathering “soft information” about the likelihood of 
borrower default and instead caused loan originators and other market 
participants to focus almost exclusively on such “hard information” as 
FICO scores and loan to value ratios.  At each stage of the loan and 
securitization process, securitization encouraged market participants to 
push risk to the very edge of what the applicable market standards would 
tolerate, to make the largest, riskiest loans that could be sold on Wall 
Street, to bundle them using the fewest credit enhancements rating 
agencies would permit, and then to repeat the securitization process with 
many of the lower-rated mortgage-backed securities that resulted. Loan 
originators could profit by bargaining down the due diligence of other 
market participants and so reduce their own underwriting standards.  
Securitization also created a business model for subprime lenders whereby 
they could “profitably fail.”  Thinly capitalized subprime lenders could 
generate large numbers of loans likely to default, along with substantial 
profits for the executives who directed them, and then simply exit the 
market when they predictably lost their access to the securitization 
pipeline.   
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The Great Collapse:   
How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown 
KURT EGGERT∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The economies of the United States and many of the world’s countries 
have been shaken by perhaps the greatest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression.  This crisis was triggered by the subprime meltdown that 
started in late 2006, when early subprime loan defaults increased 
dramatically and then subprime lenders began going out of business rather 
than buying back problem loans.  It spread as hedge funds went under, 
investors stopped purchasing securities backed by subprime loans, and 
financial institutions stopped trusting each other, leading to a massive 
credit crunch.  
The subprime meltdown, in turn, was caused in large part by the 
financial mechanism that had caused it to surge since the late 1990s, 
securitization.  Through securitization, subprime lenders could make loans 
and sell them on Wall Street, where investment houses marketed securities 
backed by pools of subprime loans.  In this way, subprime lenders could 
quickly unload much of the risk of the subprime loans as well as recoup the 
money lent and relend it to new subprime borrowers.   
Investors in securities backed by subprime securities should have 
known that these loans were risky and that the subprime market was rife 
with abusive lending practices.  Reports of predatory lending were 
widespread and even large subprime lenders had been forced to pay large 
fines for their lending practices.  However, investors were lulled into a 
false sense of security by the understanding that, however much subprime 
lenders might be overcharging or otherwise taking advantage of borrowers, 
the investors were largely protected from liability for this abusive behavior 
and were even the beneficiaries of it through the higher rates charged to 
borrowers.  Ironically, the investors that poured money into the subprime 
market seemed not to realize that securitization allowed the subprime 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law at Chapman University School of Law.  The Author would like to thank the 
members of the Connecticut Law Review for their symposium on the subprime crisis, at which an early 
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originators to take advantage of borrower and investor alike. 
Securitization received a significant stress test, and not only failed 
miserably, but also helped drag down much of the world’s economy with 
its failure.  The current recession is, to a surprising extent, caused by the 
effects of securitization itself.  While other factors also played a role in the 
meltdown, subprime securitization may represent one of the greatest 
structurally-caused financial implosions of the modern world.  In essence, 
subprime securitization acted like a virus that infected the entire American 
financial industry and affected much of the world.  And just as an outbreak 
of a disease created in a laboratory would warn against careless genetic 
engineering, the subprime crisis and the recent financial crash should warn 
against the dangers of careless financial engineering.  While securitization 
can be useful in some areas, market participants should be aware and wary 
of its flaws. 
II.  THE COLLAPSE 
Defaults and foreclosures have surged in the United States, especially 
among subprime loans.  More than twenty percent of all subprime loans 
are seriously delinquent, as are one in ten securitized near-prime loans.1 A 
record rate of eleven percent of all loans are currently at least one payment 
past due.2 Credit Suisse predicts that an astounding 8.1 million homes in 
the United States will likely be foreclosed on in the next four years.3  With 
the decrease in available credit, housing prices have plummeted and 
homeowners lost an estimated $3.3 trillion in equity in 2008.4  The 
Standard & Poors/Case-Shiller National Index has fallen more than twenty 
percent from its high, amid predictions that it may fall another fifteen 
percent.5  With this drop in housing value, an estimated fifteen to twenty 
                                                                                                                          
1 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Housing, Mortgage 
Markets, and Foreclosures, Speech at the Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and 
Mortgage Markets (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2008 
1204a.htm. 
2 Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies Continue to Climb in Latest MBA National 
Delinquency Survey, Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/ 
PressCenter/68008.htm. 
3 CREDIT SUISSE, FORECLOSURE UPDATE: OVER 8 MILLION FORECLOSURES EXPECTED (2008), 
http://www.nhc.org/Credit%20Suisse%20Update%2004%20Dec%2008.doc (last visited Feb. 16, 
2008); Press Release, SmartBrief.com, Data: Mortgage ‘Foreclosure Prevention’ Fixes Failing to Work, 
U.S. Home Foreclosure Toll Now Expected to Rise Even Higher to Eight Million (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.smartbrief.com/news/aaaa/industryPR-detail.jsp?id=F25D6EC9-C81F-4194-8EA8-
C9A7228C10EB. 
4 Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American Mortgage System: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Hearings Mortgage Lending Reform] (testimony 
of David Berenbaum, Executive Vice President of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition).  
5 Kelvin Tay, On the Lookout for the Onset of Economic Recovery, BUS. TIMES SING., Jan. 21, 
2009, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSTMS File; Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Improving the Infrastructure for Non-Agency Mortgage-Backed 
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percent of homeowners with mortgages owe more on their houses than the 
houses are worth.6  The decline in housing prices appears still to be 
continuing, if not accelerating as of early 2009.  In January, 2009, the 
Standard & Poors/Case-Shiller index of 20 metropolitan areas had fallen 
19% from the year before, a new record drop for that index, edging out the 
previous record from the month before.7  Home prices in the hardest hit 
metropolitan markets have declined by almost fifty percent.8  Housing 
prices have fallen so greatly that some noteholders are walking away from 
houses after foreclosing, preferring to avoid the costs of holding and 
attempting to sell the homes.9  
Increasing subprime mortgage defaults and plummeting housing prices 
have caused enormous losses for many financial institutions and shaken the 
confidence of many investors in the credit markets generally.10  Investors 
watched AAA-rated subprime securities be downgraded over and over, 
some ultimately ending up with junk ratings.11  With investors refusing to 
purchase securities backed by subprime loans, and purchasers of subprime 
loans demanding that the loan originators buy them back, subprime lenders 
have by and large exited the market.  Nearly 150 mortgage lenders of all 
types that employed over fifty people (and hundreds more smaller firms) 
failed or went out of business in 2007 alone.12  The subprime industry 
collapsed, falling from an estimated 33.6% of mortgage production in 2006 
to 2.8% by the fourth quarter of 2008.13  
Subprime and related mortgage risk dragged down one large financial 
institution after another, with Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual 
bankrupt, insurer AIG bailed out, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac taken 
                                                                                                                          
Securities, Speech at the Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets (Dec. 
4, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20081204a.htm. 
6 Bernanke, supra note 1.  Mortgages of this kind are often referred to as being “under water.”  Id. 
7 David Streitfeld, Home Prices in Jan. Fell by a Record Amount, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at 
B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
8 Id. 
9 Susan Saulny, In Foreclosure Crisis, a Rise in Banks Walking Away, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2009, at A2, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
10 Turmoil in US Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, 
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_ 
files/BERNANKEStatement092308_SenateBankingCommittee.pdf (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Res. Sys., The Crisis and the Policy Response, Speech at the Stamp Lecture, London School of 
Economics (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a. 
htm. 
11 Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
12 Press Release, MortgageDaily.com, Nearly 150 Mortgage Operations Collapse in 2007 (Jan. 
22, 2008), http://www.mortgagedaily.com/PressRelease012208.asp. 
13 Hearings Mortgage Lending Reform, supra note 4, at 2 (testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for 
Responsible Lending) (citing Inside B&C Lending) (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.imfpubs.com/ 
imfpubs_ibcl/about.html).  
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over by the government.14  Private-label securitization, done without the 
participation of government-sponsored entities (GSEs) like Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, has virtually been shut down.15  Lending between 
financial institutions such as banks for terms longer than a few days by and 
large ceased in September and October of 2008.16  In October 2008, there 
was a real possibility of an international financial collapse.17  Surviving 
banks and other financial institutions received an offer of $250 billion in 
bailouts in late 2008 and have pleaded for more.18   
Inevitably, as in most post mortems, fingers will be pointed in many 
directions, from the “originate-to-distribute” model of subprime 
origination, whereby lenders quickly offload much of the risk of default, to 
the greed that seems to have run rampant on Wall Street, to the lack of 
regulation over subprime lenders.  Some have blamed Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac for excessive involvement in the subprime market, others for 
not participating in and influencing subprime enough.  This Article, 
however, focuses on one causative aspect: how a prime element of the 
subprime meltdown is the flawed structure of securitization itself and how, 
because of the securitization of subprime and other non-prime mortgages, 
as well as the resecuritization of some of the resulting subprime-backed 
securities, many of the villains of the story were acting based on incentives 
generated by that structure.   While there were multiple causes of the 
subprime boom and collapse, securitization itself was a significant cause of 
both.   
Specifically, this Article argues that securitization turned a significant 
portion of subprime and near-prime lending over to a new business model 
for lending.  The securitization model of subprime lending consists of 
companies designed to ramp up quickly during boom years, make as much 
money as possible for the owners or top executives of the company, then as 
                                                                                                                          
14 Souphala Chomsisengphet et al., Product Innovation & Mortgage Selection in the Subprime Era 
(Oct. 23, 2008) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1288726. 
15 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., The Future of Mortgage 
Finance in the United States, Speech at the UC Berkeley/UCLA Symposium: The Mortgage Meltdown, 
the Economy, and Public Policy (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20081031a.htm. 
16 Financial and Economic Challenges Facing Small Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Business, 110th Cong. 39 (2008), available at http://clerk.house.gov/library/reference-
files/110_sma_066.pdf [hereinafter Small Business Hearing] (statement of Randall S. Kroszner, 
Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.). 
17 Priorities for the Next Administration: Use of TARP Funds Under EESA: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ 
financialsvcs_dem/kohn011309.pdf (statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Res. Sys.). 
18 Oversight of Implementation of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and of 
Government Lending and Insurance Facilities; Impact on Economy and Credit Availability: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://financialservices. 
house.gov/hearing110/bernanke111808.pdf (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.). 
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necessary, go out of business, leaving billions of dollars of bad loans in 
their wake.  These lenders established the culture and business methods of 
the subprime market.  A central element of the subprime lending model in 
the age of securitization is that many subprime lenders were designed so 
that they could profitably fail, at least profitably for the individuals who 
operated the subprime lending institutions. 
Worse yet, securitization gave not only an incentive but also a means 
for subprime lenders to bargain down the standards of much of the 
financial industry of the United States.  Securitization took what had been 
a single financial institution—a lender that made and underwrote its own 
loans and held them until they matured—and “atomized” it into its 
constituent parts.19  As Michael Jacobides, noted, “The mortgage banking 
industry is one of the most fascinating examples of vertical disintegration 
and reconfiguration in modern business history.”20  By splitting the work 
of lenders among numerous entities, it allowed the subprime originator to 
bargain with the other entities in the securitization chain to downgrade the 
other entities’ efforts to maintain loan quality.  Furthermore, because so 
many actors in the securitization process were paid based on quantity 
rather than quality of loans, they were often willing participants in 
handling lower and lower quality loans.  This corruption of the entire 
securitization process allowed originators and their Wall Street enablers to 
drive down loan quality, securitize the resulting risky loans, and sell the 
mortgage-backed securities to investors. 
These difficulties can spring up in the securitization of many types of 
assets, and the current economic crisis did not spring solely from subprime 
loans.  As Federal Reserve Board Chairman Bernanke noted, “the boom in 
subprime mortgage lending was only a part of a much broader credit boom 
characterized by an underpricing of risk, excessive leverage, and the 
creation of complex and opaque financial instruments that proved fragile 
under stress.”21  This Article, however, focuses on the securitization of 
subprime loans, where securitization’s fragility and instability have been 
most apparent and its effects most damaging.  Securitization is no doubt 
useful and workable in many contexts.  However, its weaknesses have to 
be understood, and the securitization of subprime loans is the best Petri 
dish in which to study the structural flaws of securitization. 
The destabilizing effect of securitization appears both at the beginning 
of its process and at its end, in both the origination of the asset to be 
securitized and at the resolution of problems that occur during the life of 
the securitized asset.  Securitization not only weakens loan underwriting, 
                                                                                                                          
19 Michael G. Jacobides, Mortgage Banking Unbundling: Structure, Automation and Profit, 
MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 1, 2001, at 28.  
20 Id. 
21 Bernanke, supra note 10. 
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but, as has been discussed elsewhere, it also makes it more difficult for the 
poorly underwritten loans that do go into default to be worked out, and for 
borrowers to avoid foreclosure by obtaining a loan modification.22 
Securitization also amplifies the effects of the defaults that it causes.  
The effect of subprime defaults was magnified by the effect of 
downgrading investment-grade securities.  If more loans than expected in a 
lender’s portfolio of loans go into default, the lender might easily deal with 
the resulting loss.  However, a similar unexpected increase in defaults in a 
pool of securitized loans can have a cascading effect.  A sufficiently large 
number of unexpected defaults would cause the entire basket of securities 
to be downgraded, including the highest rated, investment grade securities.  
If investment grade securities are downgraded to below investment grade, 
this downgrade can cause losses to some institutions that own them far in 
excess of the credit loss. Some financial institutions or insurance 
companies have the requirement of holding investment grade securities 
“hard coded” into them through regulation or agreements.  If they hold too 
many downgraded securities, they could be considered “troubled,” and 
might have to raise significant additional capital, and may have their 
liquidity and counterparty status affected.23 
III.  SECURITIZATION AND THE SUBPRIME MARKET 
Securitizing subprime and other non-prime loans damaged the process 
of underwriting those loans by fundamentally changing the way lenders 
viewed underwriting.  Instead of viewing underwriting as a tool to protect 
lenders against losses, lenders that securitized their loans viewed it as a 
hurdle to clear in order to sell the loan.  Instead of being welcomed as the 
lender’s protector, the underwriting department was too often considered 
the “Department of Production Reduction.”24    
At the heart of the subprime crisis is the increasing number of 
subprime and other non-prime loans that went and are going into default, 
often before the first payment.  Had these loans been held by their 
originators, the effect of a large and unexpected increase in defaults would 
have been limited.  The subprime originators would face severe financial 
hardship.  Many, if not most, would go out of business, and this result 
                                                                                                                          
22 See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s Preventive Servicing Is Good for 
Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 279, 285–86 (2007) [hereinafter Eggert, Comment] (noting “several barriers to effective 
preventive servicing and its attendant loan modifications”); see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due 
Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 503 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=904661 [herinafter 
Eggert, Held Up in Due Course]. 
23 Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/berg032509.pdf (testimony of  Richard S. 
Berg, CEO of Performance Trust Capital Partners, LLC). 
24 Kevin Coop, Has Change Arrived?, MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1, 2009, at 93. 
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would purge the market of many subprime loan originators that made 
excessively risky loans.  Thus, the pain and damage of the subprime 
meltdown would largely have been contained to the subprime market. 
However, through the wonders of securitization, the interests in the 
defaulting loans had been sliced and diced, tranched and sold, then often 
resecuritized, retranched and resold, perhaps several times over.  The risk 
of default was no longer concentrated in the lenders responsible for the 
loans, but instead was distributed in a complex and opaque way throughout 
the financial industry and among a multitude of investors, some completely 
unaware that their investments ultimately depended on the stability of the 
subprime market. 
Rather than causing a world-wide financial crisis, securitization was 
supposed to make mortgage lending more profitable by providing lenders 
with broader sources of funding than the deposits obtained by banks, and 
by allowing them to offload their exposure to risks such as interest rate 
changes, prepayment, defaults and foreclosures, thus reducing the cost to 
lend.25  For years, many commentators had praised the efficacy of 
securitization and its benefits for the mortgage industry.26   
Securitization allowed investors from throughout the world to invest in 
real estate in the United States through the purchase of securities backed by 
American residential mortgages.  At least partially as a result of the funds 
pouring into the American mortgage market, prices for American homes 
boomed, with average home prices increasing from about $150,000 in 
1997 to more than $250,000 in 2005.27  The profits of the financial services 
industry also ballooned before the recent crash, with the financial sector 
portion of the Standard & Poor’s 500 at twenty-one percent of the total, an 
increase of five and a half percentage points in a decade.28  With the 
leverage that securitization provided, the productivity of the financial 
institutions compared to the capital they held seemed to increase, though 
sizable risks were held off-balance-sheet, through securitization and 
derivatives, for example.29 
                                                                                                                          
25 Bernanke, supra note 10. 
26 See e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
133, 133 (1994) (explaining “why securitization enables many companies to raise funds at a lower cost 
than through traditional financing”); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How 
Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open The Capital 
Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 140 (“Structured finance offers 
a company important advantages over other approaches to raising capital.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 607, 607–08 (1990) 
(discussing the advantages of structured finance within the context of corporate finance).   
27 L. Randall Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown 27–28 (Levy Econ. Inst. Of Bard Coll., 
Working Paper No. 522, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070833. 
28 Kevin Warsh, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., The Promise and Peril of the 
New Financial Architecture, Speech at the Money Marketeers of New York University (Nov. 6, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20081106a.htm.  
29 Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Productivity and 
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Exactly how securitization is accomplished has been extensively 
described elsewhere, and therefore the following is merely a thumbnail 
sketch.30  In the process of mortgage securitization, a pool of mortgages is 
assembled (“pooled”) and transferred to an entity designed solely to hold 
those loans (the “Special-Purpose Vehicle” or SPV).  Securities are then 
issued which are backed by those mortgages, and the securities are sold to 
investors, who will be repaid from the payments made by borrowers or the 
proceeds of foreclosure sales.  A servicer collects the mortgage payments 
and may foreclose if necessary.  Typically, an investment house is 
involved in the pooling of subprime mortgages and resulting sale of 
securities, and a rating agency rates the resulting securities.  To provide 
different investors with securities featuring different sets of risk and 
rewards, interest in the payment flow from the mortgages is divided up into 
different strips of payments, called tranches, so that some securities receive 
an earlier and more secure income stream in exchange for a lower return.  
The securitization is set up so that the majority of the resulting securities 
would be rated AAA by the rating agencies, indicating that they should be 
highly secure.  Other securities would receive less secure payment streams 
with the chance of higher returns, and were normally given lower credit 
ratings as a result.  In a typical securitization of residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS), about eighty percent of the resulting securities 
would be rated AAA, considered “investor grade,” another ten percent AA, 
five percent A, and five percent BBB+ or lower.31 
The securitization of subprime loans began in the late 1980s, when 
subprime lenders concentrated in Orange County, California, discovered 
that they could offload their subprime loans to Wall Street investors by 
selling securities based on pools of those subprime loans.32  These lenders 
had been “hard money” lenders, requiring low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
and relying on the ability to foreclose on substantial equity in the house 
should the borrower default.33  When Wall Street discovered hard money 
                                                                                                                          
Innovation in Financial Services, Speech at the Official Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the 
Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech 
/kohn20081112a.htm. 
30 For explanations of that process, see Eggert, Held Up in Due Course, supra note 22, at 535–45; 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory 
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2045–48 (2007) (discussing the evolution of private label 
securitization); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
2199–2213 (2007) (providing an overview of the structured finance process from origination to 
securitization). 
31 John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. 
Subprime Mortgage Markets, in Int’l Monetary Fund, United States: Selected Issues, at 37, 39, IMF 
Country Report No. 07/265, July 11, 2007, available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/ 
2007/cr07265.pdf. 
32 John Gittelsohn, How Subprime Started in Orange County, Calif., ORANGE COUNTY REG. 
(Cal.), Dec. 30, 2007, available at LEXIS, News Library, MCTBUS File. 
33 Comment, Everybody Goes Lending, Lending USA, MORTGAGE STRATEGY, June 16, 2008, at 
32, available at LEXIS, News Library, MORSGY File. 
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lenders, these lenders went mainstream.  A reporter explained, “‘Hard 
money’ gave way to ‘B&C’ which gave way to more advertising-friendly 
monikers like ‘home equity,’ ‘sub-prime’ or ‘non-prime.’”34  In the early 
1990s, there were few subprime mortgage originations, but with 
securitization, subprime boomed, and subprime origination topped $625 
billion dollars by 2005.35  That same year, the peak year for issuance of 
subprime RMBS, $508 billion of such securities were sold on Wall 
Street.36  
Once Wall Street discovered how to securitize subprime loans, and 
investors discovered that AAA-rated securities backed by subprime loans 
provided a greater return than some other investments rated as equally 
secure, the complex financial engineering kicked into high gear.  If risky 
subprime loans could be converted into securities, many of them rated 
AAA, then other risky assets could receive the same treatment, including 
the junior tranches of subprime RMBS.  The lower-rated tranches of 
subprime RMBS were pooled and transferred to a new SPV, often along 
with other assets, and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securities 
backed by these assets held by the SPV were created.37  In that way, new 
AAA-rated securities could be created from the lower rated and previously 
hard to sell tranches of subprime loan pools.38  Even though they were 
created from BBB, or worse, RMBS, as much as 80% of the resulting CDO 
securities would be rated AAA.39  CDO issuance boomed, increasing from  
$300 billion to almost $2 trillion between 1997 and 2006.40   
Enterprising Wall Street denizens even created CDO-squared or cubed, 
where the CDO securities were pooled and tranched, whereby new AAA-
rated securities could be created from the riskier CDO tranches.41  Often, 
the lower ranked tranches of securities from CDOs were those 
resecuritized in new CDOs.42  Many of the resulting securities were highly 
rated despite their great risk.  According to a 2007 report, “Some 80% of 
these structures likewise boast triple-A ratings, even though some industry 
insiders say the value of the instruments would be wiped out, from the 
                                                                                                                          
34 Id. 
35 Chomsisenghet et al., supra note 14. 
36 Gittelsohn, supra note 32. 
37 Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go?  How Misapplied Bond Ratings 
Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 70 (May 3, 
2007) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475. 
38 See Yongheng Deng et al., CDO Market Implosion And The Pricing Of Subprime Mortgage-
Backed Securities 3 (Working Paper No. Mar. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356630. 
39 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Laing, Aftershock of US Sub-Prime Debacle will be Felt on a Global 
Scale, THE BUSINESS (UK), July 14, 2007, available at LEXIS, News Library, SUNBUS File. 
40 Yongheng Deng et al., supra note 38, at 3.  
41 See Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007–2008: A Discussion of the Background, Market 
Reactions, and Policy Responses, 90 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 531, 537–38 (2008), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Mizen.pdf. 
42 Kiff & Mills, supra note 31, at 39. 
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triple-A tranches down, if the underlying collateral suffered cumulative 
losses of around 5%.”43  Through its mysterious alchemy, securitization 
could create highly rated securities backed by the riskiest twenty percent of 
tranches of securities built from the riskiest twenty percent of tranches of 
securities based on already default-prone subprime loans.  Securitization 
seemed to be able to spin endless amounts of Wall Street gold, in the form 
of AAA-rated securities, out of even the most suspect and speculative 
straw. 
The resulting securities were so far removed from the initial subprime 
mortgages on which they depended that it was almost impossible for 
investors to track CDO securities to the subprime mortgages that created 
their value.  Instead, they depended by and large on the ratings provided at 
the time of securitization.  However, as we shall see, even the rating 
agencies were overwhelmed by the complexity of the securities they were 
rating; in many cases they rated securities without an adequate past history 
to predict future behavior or sufficient analysis of the likelihood of loss. 
The entire house of cards—the subprime RMB securities, the CDOs 
based on RMB securities, and the CDOs-squared and cubed—depended on 
the payments made by borrowers and the likelihood that the borrowers 
would continue to make their payments.  However, while all of these 
complex assets depended on repayment by borrowers, securitization 
undermined the likelihood of that repayment.  As will be discussed in the 
next section, securitization made repayment by borrowers less likely by 
degrading the quality of underwriting that subprime originators used in 
determining which borrowers to lend to and at what terms and by 
encouraging the use of more risky loan models.  Securitization not only 
undermined underwriting standards, it also for a time successfully 
concealed the declining underwriting standards from many investors, as 
many investors did not have the information they needed to discover the 
decline in underwriting.44  Securitization gave loan originators an incentive 
to make loans that were too likely to default as well as the tools to conceal 
poor loan quality from the ultimate purchasers of those loans: the investors 
in mortgage-backed securities or in other financial instruments ultimately 
backed by mortgage-backed securities.  In this way, subprime lenders 
could take advantage of borrowers and investors alike. 
IV.  “Hard” and “Soft” Mortgage Underwriting 
To see how securitization degraded underwriting, it is important to 
understand the process and purpose of loan underwriting.  Underwriting is 
                                                                                                                          
43 Laing, supra note 39. 
44 See Small Business Hearing, supra note 16, at 2 (claiming that the lack of information caused 
by a deterioration in underwriting was a “significant hindrance” to investors). 
 2009] HOW SECURITIZATION CAUSED THE SUBPRIME MELTDOWN 1269 
the systematic analysis of risk associated with a particular loan and the 
determination before the loan is made whether the likely reward associated 
with the loan is worth that risk.45  Underwriting is based on the observable 
characteristics of the borrower, the loan, the security, and outside 
influences on the borrower, loan, and security at the time of the origination 
of the loan, and then comparing those characteristics to historical patterns 
of default.46  The purpose of underwriting is to reject loans that are too 
risky given the market interest rate, and therefore it is a primary form of 
credit rationing.47  Underwriting is crucial to lending because, while 
defaults are historically fairly rare, they are extremely costly to the holders 
of the loan, making the mortgage-default function “extremely 
asymmetric.”48  
A loan has different elements of risk, including whether: the loan will 
be prepaid, with principal returned but no further interest payments; a loan 
will default and the income stream from the loan will be interrupted or 
cease; the holder of the loan will have to foreclose on the security and so 
incur the costs associated with foreclosure; the value of the security will 
not be sufficient to protect the holder of the loan’s interest should the 
borrower default; and/or litigation will ensue, either in claims against the 
borrower or the borrower’s claims against the lender.49  There are risks that 
reside with the individual borrower and the specific property, such as the 
likelihood that the individual borrower will lose his or her job or the value 
of the property will decline.  There are also systemic risks: inflation will 
increase and interest rates go up, making a loan at a fixed rate less 
valuable; the overall economy will decline, making it more likely that the 
borrower will be unable to repay or that the overall value of property will 
decline, reducing the value of the property securing the loan.  A third type 
of risk is associated with the loan itself; a loan may be too large given the 
borrower’s ability to repay, have a high interest rate, or it may have other 
characteristics that increase the likelihood of default independently of the 
                                                                                                                          
45 Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Where’s the Smoking Gun?  A Study of Underwriting 
Standards for US Subprime Mortgages 7 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 2008-036A, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286106. 
46 Id. (noting that “[m]ortgage underwriting refers to the process used by a mortgagee (lender) to 
assess the credit risk of the mortgagor (borrower)” and “involves summarizing the ex ante risk of 
default from a profile of borrower attributes with the purpose of approving or denying the borrower’s 
loan application,” and therefore “is based on the borrower’s observable characteristics at the time of 
origination”) (emphasis omitted). 
47 See Tyler T. Yang et al., An Analysis of the Ex Ante Probabilities of Mortgage Prepayment and 
Default, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 651, 652 (1998) (stating that mortgage underwriting “rations mortgage 
quantity by rejecting those loans that are deemed too risky at the market interest rate”). 
48 Susan Wharton Gates et al., Automated Underwriting in Mortgage Lending: Good News for the 
Underserved?, 13 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 369, 384 (2002). 
49 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 30, at 2050–54 (discussing the risks of default, prepayment, 
and litigation); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 489, 492–94 (1991) (discussing the costs of foreclosure litigation and the potential that the resale 
of the property will be inadequate to cover the debt owed). 
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borrower or property characteristics or the systemic risks.50   
While the empirical research on the cause of homeowner default is 
sometimes conflicting, the prime determinants of default appear to be 
borrowers’ income and assets, and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of the 
loan to the house securing it.51  The LTV is “the ratio of the unpaid 
principal balance of the loan to the lesser of the appraised value or sales 
price of the property.”52  The LTV incorporates the homeowner’s equity in 
the house, a crucial element because borrowers with positive equity can 
often sell their homes or refinance their loans if they run into payment 
trouble.53   
Borrower income is used in two separate ratios employed by lenders to 
determine borrowers’ ability to repay debt.  One ratio is the borrower’s 
“total-debt-to-income” ratio, or “total debt ratio,” with debt including all 
fixed installment debt, such as student or car loans, along with payments 
on the proposed mortgage loan.54  Another ratio is “housing-expenses-to-
gross-income,” with American households averaging between fifteen and 
forty percent of their income spent on housing.55   
Credit scores also play a large role in predicting default, as do external 
market conditions in causing default.56  Credit scores are the attempt to 
reduce a borrower’s credit history to a single number, weighting such 
elements as a borrower’s payment history and whether a borrower has 
defaulted on other loans.57  Fair, Isaac & Company has a virtual monopoly 
on the sales of credit scoring, supplying credit scoring models to the three 
major credit bureaus; hence credit scores are called “FICO” scores, even 
though there are three separate agencies that can supply conflicting scores 
based on their individual models.58  FICO scores are based on information 
                                                                                                                          
50 INST. OF FIN. EDUC., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING, excerpted in GERALD KORNGOLD & 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 389–90 (4th ed. 2002). 
51 See Michelle A. Danis & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of Subprime Mortgages 
8–9 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2005-022A, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=761804 (citing two studies which report the importance of income 
and LTV as empirical indicators of delinquency). 
52 GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 217 (5th ed. 2005).  
53 See Richard L. Cooperstein et al., Modeling Mortgage Terminations in Turbulent Times, 19 
AREUEA J. 473, 473 (1991) (“When the market value of a home is sufficient to provide a net capital 
gain, the owner has three options: to hold, sell, or refinance.”). 
54 LEFCOE, supra note 52, at 215. 
55 Id.  Another less precise ratio is the “Gross Annual Income Multiplier” (GAIM), which 
assumes that a borrower can typically afford a loan balance two to three times their annual income, 
depending on other factors such as interest rates.  Id.   
56 See Danis & Pennington-Cross, supra note 51, at 9 (finding credit scores, economic conditions 
in the labor and housing markets, and, with respect to nonprofit lenders, the internal incentive structure 
of the nonprofit agency to all be significant factors). 
57 LEFCOE, supra note 52, at 216. 
58 See Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Can New Americans Achieve the American Dream?  Promoting 
Homeownership in Immigrant Communities, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 169, 179 n.50 (2004) 
(referring to credit scoring as a “well-institutionalized process”) (citing DEANNE LOONIN & CHI CHI 
WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION 1 (3d ed. 2002)); see also LEFCOE, supra 
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provided by the credit reporting agencies.59  Credit scores do not exactly 
correlate with income, in that high-income borrowers may have low credit 
scores, and vice versa, depending on their payment histories.60  FICO 
scores range from 300 to 900, with most scores between 600 and 800.61  
One indication of a subprime loan is that the borrower has a FICO score 
below 660, according to bank regulators, or 620, among lenders.62  
Another important determinant of default is the occurrence of “trigger 
events,” life events that increase the difficulty of making mortgage 
payments, such as unemployment or divorce.  However, it is difficult to 
predict at loan origination whether such events will occur or how the 
borrowers will react.63  Ignoring greater market conditions for the moment, 
underwriting to a great extent depends on a three-legged stool, with credit 
scores as one leg, LTV as another, and borrower income and assets 
compared to debt load as the third.64  These three legs have been described 
as the “‘three C’s’: capacity, credit reputation, and collateral,” with 
capacity being the “borrower’s income, debts, and cash reserves,” credit 
reputation—represented by the credit score—the borrower’s history of 
repayment as well as account information such as balance and age of 
account, and collateral including both the property and the amount of the 
borrower down payment.65 
Another central aspect of underwriting is documenting the above 
criteria, including “the extent to which the mortgagor’s income and assets 
have been verified by third party sources such as employers, tax returns, 
and bank account statements.”66  Without adequate documentation, all of 
the criteria on which a loan is underwritten are called into question.  Where 
loans are not fully documented, the level of risk for the loans to some 
extent is determined by which party requested the lack of documentation.   
                                                                                                                          
note 52, at 216 (noting that mortgage companies “all ponder pretty much the same information”). 
59 Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life And Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of 
Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 177 n.74 (2007). 
60 See LEFCOE, supra note 52, at 216 (“Borrowers with higher incomes don’t necessarily have the 
best credit scores.”). 
61 Amy Buttell Crane, Don’t Let Mortgage Insurance Surprise You At Closing Table, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 21, 2006, at E2, available at LEXIS, News Library, SEAPIN File. 
62 EUGENE A. LUDWIG ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: PAST SUCCESSES AND 
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES, in REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT FRANCISCO 84, 93 (A Joint Publication of the Fed. Reserve Banks of Boston and 
San Francisco, Feb. 2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/cra/index.html. 
63 See CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, THE ROLE OF TRIGGER EVENTS IN ENDING HOMEOWNERSHIP 
SPELLS: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/trigger_final_report.pdf (“[T]he financial impact of specific 
trigger events are likely to vary a great deal across borrowers.”). 
64 While higher LTV ratios increase the risk of default, they appear to decrease the risk of 
prepayment, as borrowers have greater difficulty refinancing the loans.  Therefore, higher LTV ratios 
do have some beneficial effect for lenders.  Danis & Pennington-Cross, supra note 51, at 17. 
65 LEFCOE, supra note 52, at 215. 
66 Andrew Haughwout, Richard Peach, and Joseph Tracy, Juvenile Delinquent Mortgages: Bad 
Credit or Bad Economy?, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 341, 1, Aug. 2008. 
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Where borrowers request low or no documentation loans, those loans are 
more likely to default than instances where the lender determines that full 
documentation is not required. 
Subprime loans are typically more prone to default than prime, 
resulting in the generally higher interest rates and fees that subprime 
borrowers pay.67  Even before the subprime crisis, non-prime loans were 
estimated to be six times as likely to go into default as prime loans.68  
However, attempting to compensate for risk by charging higher prices for 
subprime loans only adds to the risk, as the higher interest rate and/or fee 
makes the subprime loan more likely to default.69  Subprime loans are an 
odd product in that the seller’s attempt to compensate for risk of default 
increases the very risk at issue. 
Some subprime loans are more risky than others.  Some are likely to 
default simply because the amount of mortgage payments are more than 
the borrower can afford.  For others, however, the likelihood of default is 
increased by the way the loan is structured.  Examples of loans that by 
their very nature are more risky than traditional 30-year fixed loans are: 
hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages, often called 2/28s or 3/27s because they 
are fixed for two or three years and are then adjustable for the remainder of 
the thirty year term.  These loans are designed to force borrowers to 
refinance after two or three years, essentially allowing the lender to call the 
loan at that point by forcing a refinancing unless the borrower is willing 
and able to make a significantly higher monthly payment.70  Also more 
prone to default are payment option adjustable-rate mortgages, where the 
borrower can, for a time, choose to make monthly payments less than 
needed to pay principal and interest, allowing for “negative amortization” 
where the loan principal increases rather than decreases.71   
Adjustable rate loans transfer from lenders to borrowers the risk that 
interest rates will increase, as compared to fixed rate loans where lenders 
retain that risk.  However, adjustable rate loans transfer that risk in a 
manner that may be difficult for borrowers to understand or predict.  This 
risk transfer increases the sensitivity of and danger to borrowers regarding 
                                                                                                                          
67 Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
Jackson Hole Conference, Aug., 2008, 6 (2008) available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/ 
2008/Gorton.08.04.08.pdf.  
68 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime 
Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 32 (2006), available at 
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf. 
69 See Wray, supra note 27, at 9 (finding these so-called “affordability products” not to be 
affordable due to subsequent need for refinancing and payment penalties).  Wray’s article expounds on 
the writings of the noted financial system commentator Hyman Minsky.  Id. at 2. 
70 Gorton, supra note 67, at 13. 
71 Subprime Mortgage Crisis and America’s Veterans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. 
Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 47 (2008) (statement of Ellen Harnick, 
Sr. Policy Counsel, Ctr. for Responsible Lending). 
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economic and financial conditions that can increase interest rates.72  Since 
these loans are often structured with an introductory lower “teaser rate,” 
borrowers can experience “reset shock” when their mortgage payments 
increase substantially.73  The existence of this reset shock may come as a 
surprise to borrowers who were not adequately informed of it by their 
lenders or brokers.74  The timing of the payment increases for payment 
option loans is often a surprise, as the loan may readjust when the loan 
balance reaches a set cap rather than waiting a set number of years.75  It is 
possible to overstate the effect of the reset shock, however, because the 
initial teaser rates charged to borrowers often were not very low to begin 
with, so the new rates might not be that much higher.76  Hybrid adjustable 
rate mortgages were quite popular with securitizers and made up almost 
three-quarters of securitized subprime loans by 2004.77 
Underwriting can be characterized as two general types, though both 
types may and should be used and there may be overlap between the types.  
On the one hand, a lender may rely on “soft” mortgage underwriting, that 
is subjective, personalized underwriting that depends on direct, often 
difficult to quantify “soft” information about the borrower, the property, 
the local economy, etc.  This may include knowledge about the likelihood 
that a borrower will lose a job or gain another, and whether a neighborhood 
is going up or down in value.78  “Soft” information may also include 
listening to the borrower’s explanation for past credit difficulties in an 
attempt to discover whether such problems will reoccur.79  Soft mortgage 
underwriting involves not only the use of soft information, but also “soft 
analysis,” human, somewhat subjective analysis of the risk as opposed to 
an automated, strictly objective analysis. 
A lender may also use “hard” mortgage underwriting, now normally 
automated, which relies on objective information that can be determined 
and confirmed with little direct knowledge of the borrower.  “Hard” 
                                                                                                                          
72 See Chomsisengphet et al., supra note 14, at 12 (“[T]he increasing use of exotic and new 
mortgage products helped to set the stage by increasing the sensitivity of a cohort of loans and 
borrowers to contemporaneous economic and financial conditions.”). 
73 Kiff & Mills, supra note 31, at 42, 44. 
74 Gil Sandler, Aggressive Mortgage Lending and the Housing Market: The Economic Impact of 
Minor Miscalculations, 24 REAL ESTATE FIN. 3 (2007). 
75 See id. at 42–43 (describing how loans may convert upon hitting a set cap and suggesting that 
“[f]raud appears to have played a key role in accelerating the deterioration”). 
76 See Christopher L. Foote et al., Subprime Facts: What (We Think) We Know About the 
Subprime Crisis and What We Don’t 2 (Fed. Res. Bd. Pub. Pol’y Discussion Papers, Paper No. 08-2), 
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2008/ppdp0802.pdf (“Subprime teaser rates were 
not exceptionally low . . . The interest-rate resets, although not trivial, were not explosive.”). 
77 Wray, supra note 27, at 31.   
78 Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives and 
Defaults 3 (Chi. Graduate Sch. Bus., Research Paper No. 08-19, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296982. 
79 Because this involves listening to the borrower’s story, loans made on this basis have been 
called “story loans.”  LEFCOE, supra note 52, at 217. 
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information includes data or analyses provided by third parties.  This 
objective information may include FICO scores and loan to value ratios 
based on third party or automated appraisals.80  This hard information can 
be fed into automated underwriting systems that use solely objective 
criteria to make underwriting decisions, and such underwriting is “hard” 
both in terms of the information used and also the method of analysis by an 
automated system. 
Each type of underwriting has its own strengths and weaknesses.  
Subjective, personal underwriting may protect a lender from borrower or 
broker fraud that involves the misstatement of the borrower’s income or 
the property’s value, as the lender could have enough independent 
information or direct observation regarding income or property value to 
spot significant misstatements.  On the other hand, more purely subjective 
underwriting more easily allows lenders or their agents to engage in and 
conceal such underhanded activities as red-lining against minority 
borrowers, refusing to lend to borrowers for reasons other than the 
likelihood of repayment or loss, and lending based on friendship or 
favors.81  Subjective underwriting therefore requires monitoring of lenders’ 
underwriters to insure consistency and lack of favoritism.  Subjective, 
personal underwriting is normally more labor and time intensive, as it may 
depend on human analysis of the borrower’s income and expenses and the 
likelihood of change, as well as other risk factors.  Similarly, decisions 
about whether to grant a loan may take more time if they depend on 
subjective observations and analysis of the borrower and property.82  
Automated, objective underwriting has a contrasting set of strengths 
and weaknesses.  By relying on objective criteria and removing subjective 
decision making, automated underwriting may well be more accurate, by 
itself, than manual underwriting would be by itself, at least according to 
one study.83  When underwriting decisions are made based on objective 
information that can often be easily and quickly obtained, such as the 
borrower’s FICO score or LTV ratio, loan decisions can be made more 
quickly and inexpensively.  Instead of taking weeks, loan approval can be 
made in seconds, giving lenders who can grant quick approval to loans a 
competitive edge over slower lenders.84  A survey conducted by Fannie 
Mae in 2001 found that automated underwriting saved lenders on average 
                                                                                                                          
80 Charles D. Anderson et al., Deconstructing the Subprime Debacle Using New Indices of 
Underwriting Quality and Economic Conditions: A First Look 3 (July 15, 2008) (unpublished working 
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160073. 
81 Gates et al., supra note 48, at 373. 
82 Rajan et al., supra note 78, at 3. 
83 Id. 
84 Lynnley Browning, The Subprime Loan Machine; Automated Underwriting Software Helped 
Fuel A Mortgage Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT 
File.   
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$916 to close a loan.85  Automated underwriting substantially increased the 
potential volume of loans subprime lenders could make, both by reducing 
the time and cost of making loans, but also by helping lenders identify 
subprime credit-worthy borrowers they might have otherwise missed.86  
Objective underwriting is also a weapon in the war against red-lining.  A 
lender who decides whether to make loans strictly based on FICO scores 
and LTV ratios is less likely to deny loans based on gender or ethnicity.87  
On the other hand, minority borrowers typically have lower FICO scores 
than their white counterparts, with the frequency of low scores, those 
below 620, more than double among blacks than among whites.88  
“Soft” mortgage underwriting is much better at reacting to new 
mortgage conditions or products, as the underwriters can apply common-
sense to the changing conditions.  By comparison, “hard” mortgage 
underwriting depends much more on statistical analyses based on historical 
default rates.  Where market conditions or products change rapidly and 
substantially, automated underwriting programs may continue to apply 
their now antiquated statistical analysis and so approve many loans that 
they should not.89  With the recent dramatic changes in the types of loans 
offered, the borrowers they were offered to, and when and why 
documentation was required, automated underwriting became unmoored 
from its database of historic default rates, as it was being asked to analyze 
risk for loans, borrowers, and documentation levels that had never been put 
together before on a wide-spread basis. 
A weakness of hard mortgage underwriting, given its reliance on 
purportedly objective criteria, is the resulting possibility that brokers or 
lenders can learn the criteria and so discover how to manipulate the system 
to justify the greatest volume of loans.  One way for brokers or sales agents 
to maximize their commission, often based on loan amount, is to push 
borrowers to obtain the largest loan possible.  This upselling of amount is 
combined with upselling of interest rates, as yield spread premiums 
encourage brokers to entice borrowers into paying higher interest rates.90  
In this way, automated underwriting increases the fragility of the financial 
system by encouraging the creation of loans at the margin of those 
                                                                                                                          
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Gates et al., supra note 48, at 374. 
88 LEFCOE, supra note 52, at 217. 
89 Rajan et al., supra note 78, at 28 (stating: “However, when incentive effects lead to a change in 
the underlying regime, the coefficients from a statistical model estimated on past data have no validity 
going forward . . . Importantly, collecting historical data over a longer time period is likely to 
exacerbate the problem by aggregating data from different regimes.”). 
90 Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 3 (2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/ 
hearing/financialsvcs_dem/gordon_testimony_3-11-09_final.pdf (testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for 
Responsible Lending). 
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tolerated by the automated system rather than a broad range of loans.91  To 
make matters worse, “the loan performance data used to develop predictive 
factors were collected at a time when there was not as much upselling. 
Therefore, data were collected about average distributions, not at the 
margin.”92  In other words, automated underwriting systems are based on a 
past distribution of loans, but securitization has encouraged a more risky 
distribution of loans. 
Because mortgage brokers’ income depends in large part on how many 
loans they can close, and because they are repeat and interested players in 
the loan approval process, they have the incentive and ability to discover 
even more nefarious ways to game the system, including manipulation of 
the hard data input into the underwriting process.  The consequence of the 
manipulation is that borrowers who should not be eligible and may be 
unlikely to repay their loans still have their loans approved.  The evidence 
indicates that loans involving third party originators, such as brokers, 
default at a higher rate than loans made directly by lenders.93  Lenders that 
gather significant soft information often should be able to detect this 
manipulation, but as we shall see, because many subprime underwriters 
either did not engage in soft mortgage underwriting or, worse yet, 
participated in the manipulation of the hard criteria, the quality of 
underwriting in the subprime market declined significantly between 2000 
and 2007.  
V.  THE DECLINE OF SUBPRIME UNDERWRITING 
Many knowledgeable observers have concluded that the process of 
underwriting subprime loans became compromised during the run-up to 
the 2007 subprime meltdown, and that loans that were more and more 
likely to default were made and securitized.  Despite the weakening 
underwriting and increased likelihood of default, the top tiers of securities 
from those loans typically were still rated AAA.  Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Ben Bernanke noted in 2008 that the underwriting standards had 
become increasingly compromised in recent years, with subprime loan 
origination only the “most notorious example.”94  As noted in 2008 by the 
first report of the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group:  
Weak or non-existent underwriting coupled with high 
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levels of origination fraud combined to produce loans that 
had no reasonable prospect of being repaid.  Rather, these 
loans were originated based on the assumption that housing 
appreciation would continue indefinitely and that when 
borrowers ran into trouble, they would refinance or sell.95 
That underwriting had degraded in the years before the 2007 subprime 
crisis has become a truism, repeated by multiple governmental studies and 
other commentators.96  Market participants have acknowledged the decline 
of underwriting, with one rating agency CEO claiming that his agency did 
not “appreciate the extent of shoddy mortgage origination practices and 
fraud in the 2005–2007 period.”97  Even critics of the idea that the drop in 
underwriting standards caused the subprime collapse have acknowledged 
that “[t]he dominant explanation for the meltdown in the US subprime 
mortgage market is that lending standards dramatically weakened after 
2004.”98 
In a 2002 article, this author argued that securitization compromises 
underwriting for several reasons.99  First, because originators immediately 
sell their loans, they shed much of the risk of default for those loans, 
transferring it to investors.  This shedding of default risk drastically 
decreases the value of underwriting to loan originators, except to the extent 
it helps them sell their loans.  Next, securitization reduces individualized 
underwriting (soft mortgage underwriting) and instead depends on 
automated underwriting and objectively verifiable criteria (hard mortgage 
underwriting).100  With these changes, we lost what had been a strength of 
banks’ underwriting systems—their information gathering systems and 
their long-term relationships with borrowers—and a result has been 
                                                                                                                          
95 STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
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increasing defaults and foreclosures.   
The same 2002 article also argued that securitization turned subprime 
lending over to thinly capitalized lenders that relied on the financial 
markets for their capital, and so could engage in a “boom, bust, and 
bankruptcy” cycle, in which they grew dramatically, made more and more 
loans, often with high default risk, and then disappeared or declared 
bankruptcy, leaving few assets for their borrower victims or other creditors 
to attach.101  In Part XI, it is argued that this boom and bust design is at the 
heart of the subprime crisis, as there are few constraints on lenders not to 
make bad loans where the lenders are paid by loan volume and know that 
they soon may be out of business, regardless of their lending standards. 
Since the beginning of the subprime crisis, there have been several 
studies that attempt to determine the existence and extent of this decline in 
underwriting standards.  To date, these studies appear to verify the above 
thesis: securitization increases the risk of default by undermining careful 
underwriting, which employs both hard and soft mortgage underwriting.  
Loan originators that securitize their loans have little incentive to gather 
and analyze the soft information not valued by the secondary market and 
so depend more and more exclusively on “hard,” objective, automated 
mortgage underwriting.   
Using a loan level analysis of the subprime market from 2001 through 
2006, several researchers have discovered that, in general, underwriting of 
subprime loans changed during those years, with lenders appearing to 
improve the objectively perceived quality of loans in some respects while 
allowing other objective aspects of the loans to deteriorate.  However, 
researchers who move beyond the mere objective statistics and review the 
overall change in underwriting conclude that subprime underwriting 
deteriorated substantially during the current decade and until the subprime 
collapse.   
It should be noted, however, that research based on the original loan 
data produced at the time of origination is challenging because of the 
amount of misrepresentation and subterfuge that occurred in the subprime 
market.  A true analysis of loan to value ratios, for example, would require 
a historical reappraisal of the property securing the loans, rather than 
reliance on what may have been flawed appraisals provided by lenders at 
the time the loan was originated.  Another challenge is finding the 
combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) of all loans on the subject property 
rather than just the loan-to-value ratio of a particular loan, as borrowers 
increasingly relied on “piggy-backed” seconds and other second lien loans 
to replace private mortgage insurance (PMI) and reduce the amount of 
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their down-payment.102  Researchers relying on the original loan tapes for 
loan to value ratios and FICO scores may be at risk of making the same 
mistakes that investors did in believing in the stability and accuracy of 
these numbers to indicate credit quality. 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert concluded that some hard indicia of 
underwriting improved between 2001 and 2006.  For example, FICO 
scores increased from 601 in 2001 to 621 in 2005, before dropping 
slightly.103  However, objective underwriting standards also decreased in 
several ways.  The average first lien subprime loan size in the database 
increased dramatically, from $126,000 in 2001 to $220,000 in 2007, 
indicating that the average subprime borrower was taking on a significantly 
increasing amount of debt.  The combined loan-to-value ratio also 
increased, from 79.4% in 2001 to 85.9 percent in 2006, with the growing 
popularity of second and third liens, and the percentage of the more stable 
fixed rate subprime loans decreased from 33.2% in 2001 to 19.9% in 2006, 
before increasing again in 2007.104 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert concluded that “during the dramatic 
growth of the subprime (securitized) mortgage market, the quality of the 
market deteriorated dramatically” and that the loan quality declined, even 
when adjusted for changes in “borrower characteristics (such as the credit 
score, a level of indebtedness, an ability to provide documentation), loan 
characteristics (such as a product type, an amortization term, a loan 
amount, an mortgage interest rate), and macroeconomic conditions (such 
as house price appreciation, level of neighborhood income and change in 
unemployment).”105  In other words, the quality of mortgages seemed to 
deteriorate beyond what the hard, objective data would indicate. 
Anderson, Capozza, and Van Order also studied the underwriting 
standards for the subprime market and concluded that there was a two-part 
degradation of underwriting.  In the first stage, during the 1990s, hard 
mortgage underwriting standards declined, possibly because investors 
became more comfortable with the securitization of subprime loans and so 
became more willing to accept loans with lower FICO scores and higher 
loan to value ratios.106  However, a second weakening of underwriting 
standards occurred after 2004, with less soft mortgage underwriting that 
was not as apparent to the secondary market, as FICO scores and loan to 
value ratios remained relatively stable.  Anderson et al. conclude that the 
weakened underwriting standards likely caused one half of the recent surge 
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of foreclosures, with weakened economic conditions causing the rest.107 
Coleman, LaCour-Little, and Vandell found that if combined loan-to-
value ratios are used, even the loan to property value aspect of hard 
mortgage underwriting declined substantially during the run-up to the 
subprime crash, as combined loan-to-value ratios rose considerably from 
1998 to 2006 among the loans studied.108 
Several studies have linked weakening underwriting directly to 
securitization itself.  The Mian and Sufi study of the consequences of the 
mortgage credit expansion found a direct connection between the 
expansion of securitization driven credit and increased default rates.  
Looking at zip codes that had low access to credit before subprime 
securitization, the study found that “[i]n terms of magnitudes, a one 
standard deviation increase in ‘supply-driven’ mortgage debt from 2001 to 
2005 leads to a one-half standard deviation increase in mortgage default 
rates from 2005 to 2007.”109  Another study, by Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, 
and Vig found that of two loan portfolios with similar credit quality, a 
portfolio more likely to be securitized experiences a twenty percent higher 
default rate than one less likely to be securitized, a difference the authors 
attribute to the originators’ greater incentive to screen loans they are more 
likely to hold rather than sell.110 
Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven also found a weakening of 
underwriting standards and that, controlling for economic conditions, the 
denial rate for borrowers dropped and the loan amount rate increased.111  
The study also found that denial rates were lower in areas where more 
loans were sold within a year of origination, indicating higher levels of 
securitization.  Further, it found that securitization also could be tied to 
higher credit and to income ratios, indicating more risky loans.112  The 
authors state, “This evidence partially supports the view that 
disintermediation through securitization provides lenders with incentives to 
extend riskier loans.”113  The authors also found that underwriting 
standards declined where more credit was offered, where housing prices 
appreciated more rapidly, and where large lenders entered the market.114 
Rajan, Seru, and Vig maintain that an increase in securitization leads to 
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a decrease in soft mortgage underwriting, as the soft information is not 
transferable to investors in an inexpensive and trustworthy way.  The 
authors noted that as securitization increases, the rates of subprime loans 
for borrowers with similar hard credit criteria converge, indicating that 
lenders focus more exclusively on hard information.115  Worse yet, 
statistical models designed in periods with lower levels of securitization 
break down once securitization increases and soft mortgage underwriting 
declines, leading to excessive defaults. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS THAT SECURITIZATION DID NOT UNDERMINE  
SUBPRIME UNDERWRITING 
The primary study purporting to find that subprime underwriting did 
not decline following 2001 is that of Bhardwaj and Sengupta.  Focusing on 
hard mortgage criteria, Bhardwaj and Sengupta argue that the “smoking 
gun” of declining underwriting standards is missing.  Instead, they find that 
while some aspects of underwriting, such as income documentation, 
declined, other aspects, such as FICO scores, increased between 2000 to 
2007.116  This study, however, relies on a database that does not include 
second liens,117 and so the LTV ratios it refers to are increasingly 
inaccurate as the number of second liens increased from 2003 to 2006.118  
One review of a large pool of loans found that the incidence of second 
liens increased from 3.2% in 2001 to 29.4% in 2006 for subprime loans 
and from 2.2% to 43.9% for Alt-A mortgages.119  Subprime loans with 
simultaneous seconds default at an increased rate, and so are crucial for 
any study of mortgage underwriting standards.120   
Bhardwaj and Sengupta conclude that their results, “suggest that 
although the proportion of low-doc loans was increasing over time, lenders 
sought to compensate the lack of documentation by seeking borrowers of 
higher quality, as determined by their FICO scores.”121  This begs the 
question, though, whether documentation of income and assets can be 
replaced by higher FICO scores in good underwriting.  To make that 
argument successfully would require historical data showing that such 
trade-offs worked in the past.  However, widespread underwriting of 
subprime loans without income or asset documentation was unprecedented, 
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and therefore such historical data is missing. Recent events strongly 
suggest, however, that replacing documentation of income and assets with 
increased FICO scores represents a dramatic weakening in subprime 
underwriting.  Furthermore, this analysis assumes that earlier no or low 
documentation loans were similar to later such loans.  Whether the lack of 
documentation is lender or borrower directed is significant in determining 
the effect on default rates of the lack of documentation, as will be 
discussed.   
The study also shows a decline in underwriting standards, when LTV 
(here, not even the full LTV but only the first lien LTV) ratios are 
compared to the amount of documentation for loans.  Bhardwaj and 
Sengupta’s study notes that while low documentation loans have on 
average higher LTV ratios, this spread narrows after 2000, so that 
“underwriting attempts at tempering low-documentation loans with lower 
LTVs on average was getting weaker over the years.”122  
Gorton also argues that the subprime crash should not be blamed on 
degraded underwriting.  He argues that participants in securitization up and 
down the food chain all had “skin in the game” and suffered significant 
losses during what he calls the “Panic of 2007.”123  While rating agencies 
and investment houses had significant say regarding the hard mortgage 
underwriting done by loan originators, as they determined which loans 
could be sold for securitization, they had much less influence over what 
soft mortgage underwriting, if any, was done, since they did not monitor 
the soft information.  Therefore, any examination of soft mortgage 
underwriting must focus on the incentives of originators. 
Gorton also argues that originators had incentives to engage in good 
underwriting, despite the rapid sale of their loans, stating that they had the 
requirement to repurchase loans that defaulted very quickly.124  According 
to Gorton, lenders would want to underwrite to avoid rapid defaults.  
However, early payment defaults (EPDs) did increase dramatically before 
the subprime collapse, indicating the very degradation of underwriting that 
Gorton thought the risk of EPDs would prevent.  One review of early 
payment defaults noted,  
If we look at securitized loans, we can see that by the 
fourth month after issuance (typically six months after 
origination)—which is generally a good proxy period for 
measurement of EPDs—the level of seriously delinquent 
loans in the 2006 vintage subprime securitizations is at 4 
percent (see Figure 1). This is nearly double that for the year 
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earlier (2 percent) and markedly higher than the 2003 and 
2004 vintages (at 1.5 percent)125   
Another study found that, of the loans examined, “10 percent of nonprime 
loans originated in 2007 experienced an early default, as compared to 2.7 
percent of similar loans originated in 2003.”126  Clearly, their repurchase 
obligations were not preventing originators from engaging in the lax 
underwriting that would cause early defaults. 
Also, loan originators could avoid most of the market discipline of 
EPDs.  Where originators sell to third party aggregators who then 
securitize the loans and where originators sell directly to a securitization 
trust, the deal documents typically do not include a covenant to repurchase 
EPDs.127  Some originators also narrowed the window during which they 
had to repurchase defaulting loans, from 60 or 90 days to as little as 30 
days.128  
Even where originators were bound by repurchase covenants for early 
defaults, they could often avoid much of the effect of those covenants.  
Originators could count on having to repurchase only a fraction of their 
loans that went into default, because of delay in default time and the 
possibility that servicers might foreclose rather than demand repurchase.129  
Even in the world of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, repurchases were 
expensive and so “terms are governed by extensively detailed 
requirements.  Consequently, forced repurchase is relatively rare, and some 
of the GSEs’ purchases that do not meet their underwriting standards 
remain in their portfolios.”130  Even when originators do take back 
defaulting loans, they could often replace the bad loans with other perhaps 
flawed loans they originated, further reducing their costs.131  Worse yet, if 
forced to repurchase loans, subprime lenders could simply go out of 
business after a few years of great profit.132   
Gorton’s theory is that, rather than flawed underwriting, the subprime 
panic was caused by declining housing prices.  However, the housing price 
bubble seems to have been created to a significant extent by securitization 
and the influx of capital into the American mortgage market, along with 
lax underwriting and other factors, such as the Federal Reserve Board 
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reducing its federal funds interest rate.133  Without securitization and its 
accompanying faulty underwriting, it is doubtful that the housing bubble 
would have expanded to the extent it did.  Therefore, even if Gorton’s 
thesis is correct, securitization and weak underwriting were still at the heart 
of the collapse. 
VII.  HOW UNDERWRITING WAS DEGRADED 
It appears clear that underwriting was degraded in the years prior to the 
subprime meltdown.  There was little regulation in place to mandate good 
underwriting.  Federal regulators focused for the most part on the 
profitability of their regulated institutions.  Instead of mandating 
underwriting standards, “federal regulators focused almost entirely on 
lender safety and soundness concerns.  This focus was further narrowed by 
the federal regulators` limited metrics for assessing safety and soundness, 
which centered only on the viability of lending institutions.”134  State 
regulators were hampered by their weak powers to oversee mortgage 
lenders, the dearth of state-mandated underwriting regulations and federal 
underwriting standards as well as preemption asserted by federal agencies, 
forcing them to rely on state consumer protection laws.  One state attorney 
general complained, “It was no easy matter to prove that questionable 
products and practices were illegal when there were no written federal 
rules or regulations specifically prohibiting them.”135   
With little regulation on the state or federal level to prevent it, this 
degradation of mortgage underwriting occurred through many different 
methods.  In some instances, borrowers acted alone in misrepresenting 
their financial condition.  In others, borrowers collaborated with mortgage 
brokers and lenders to create the illusion of a higher credit value.  Some 
borrowers were unwitting dupes for the actions of brokers and lenders who 
were trying to justify loans to borrowers that the borrowers would likely 
not be able to afford.  Lenders and brokers could take advantage of 
borrowers by making them appear more credit worthy than they actually 
were and so put them into loans they could not repay.  When it came to 
lowering underwriting standards, borrowers, brokers and lenders had 
several means at their disposal. 
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A.  No or Low Documentation Loans 
A primary method of degrading underwriting was the use of no or low 
documentation loans.  Such loans were originally designed for wealthy 
borrowers who might not want to disclose their income but were 
considered safe borrowers.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had not required 
full documentation for borrowers they considered exceptionally secure.136  
The use of these loans spread dramatically once they entered the subprime 
market.137  Instead of being aimed at wealthy, or very low-risk individuals, 
these loans became aggressively marketed to wage earners who should 
have received a W-2 form and could have documented at least some 
income.138  While many low documentation loans were originally done 
because the lender decided that the borrower was an exceptionally low-risk 
borrower, as time went on, low documentation loans were requested by 
borrowers.  “Borrower-directed” low documentation loans are inherently 
more risky than “lender-directed” low documentation loans, since the 
borrower may be requesting the lower level of documentation in order to 
hide fraud or misrepresentation.139   
Granting no documentation loans to W-2 wage earners is a 
questionable practice, as such borrowers should be able to document at 
least a portion of their income, and there appear to be only rare legitimate 
reasons why a lender would not want to be able to do so.  At a minimum, 
lenders should have been required to conduct inquiries of borrower assets 
and income, or at least document the need or reasons for a no or low 
document loan.  Even these minimal attempts were not taken in many 
cases, and lenders often made stated income loans when they were not 
reasonable or reasonably necessary.140 
Documentation of borrowers’ assets and income has long been 
considered part of prudent underwriting.  In the past, low documentation 
loans included at least some documentation of the borrowers’ income, such 
as pay stubs.  However, many of the low documentation programs did not 
require any proof of income.141  Many subprime automated underwriting 
systems analyzed low documentation loans based on the old, safer rules 
governing their use rather than the new, much more default-inducing rules.  
A lender-directed, high income borrower loan is much less prone to default 
than a borrower-directed loan where the borrower could have produced 
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two years of W-2s but chose not to.  One of the savviest commenters on 
the subprime crash noted that underwriting systems based on the old rules  
might allow some doc relief after the initial analysis is done, 
but they always start with the ‘assumption’ that any number 
you type in for income or assets is verifiable if not initially 
verified.  That’s a huge, important difference. . . A 
‘borrower-directed’ low doc loan simply messes up the whole 
underlying assumption of verifiability. And, of course, a 
borrower-directed low or no doc loan is, as we’ve seen, 
probably (although not necessarily, of course) already 
‘gaming’ the system: inflating the income or assets so that the 
DTI or reserve calculations come up with better results than 
they would have using verifiable numbers.142   
In 2006, one rating agency estimated that more than fifty percent of the 
subprime sector consisted of loans with less than full documentation.143  A 
review of a large pool of loans found that “from 2001 to 2006, the share of 
fully documented subprime mortgages fell from 77.8 percent to 61.7 
percent, while the share of fully documented alt-a mortgages fell from 36.8 
percent to 18.9 percent.”144  
These stated income loans were ripe for abuse, both by borrowers 
trying to obtain loans greater than their incomes would justify, and also for 
mortgage brokers and lenders who were inducing borrowers to obtain loans 
with payments larger than they could afford.145  Low documentation loans 
allowed lenders to hide faulty underwriting.146  Many loans were made to 
borrowers with no documented ability to repay them.  These no document 
loans were known as NINJA loans, for borrowers who had no income, no 
job, and no assets.147   
One reason for the expanded popularity of no documentation loans was 
the greater payment to loan originators for such loans.  Instead of being 
paid $2,000 to $4,000 for a traditional fixed-rate mortgage, a broker might 
make as much as $15,000 for a no documentation loan of $300,000.148  For 
this reason, borrowers who could have documented their loans were often 
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induced into taking more expensive no documentation loans, which cost up 
to an extra one percent in interest.  Many borrowers did not realize that 
they were paying extra for a privilege they might not have wanted, which 
could be used to justify giving them a loan they could not afford.149 
B.  Inflated Housing Appraisals 
Because of securitization, appraisers have been pressured by lenders 
and mortgage brokers to inflate the value of homes to be secured by loans.  
Lenders who hold their own loans would rarely want appraisers to 
overestimate the value of a house, since the equity in the home protects the 
lender if the borrower fails to repay the loan.  However, with securitization 
an appraisal changes from a benefit allowing a lender to protect itself to a 
hurdle that the lender has to overcome in order to sell another mortgage to 
the secondary market.  Lenders gain an incentive to game appraisals on 
loans they make, so that they can post attractive loan-to-value ratios on 
loans they wish to sell.  They might also try to cut expenses by forgoing a 
full appraisal and merely use automated valuation models or  broker price 
opinions instead.150  Similarly, mortgage brokers eager to close loans have 
great reason to obtain inflated appraisals to justify high loan amounts, 
which can lead to a higher commission, and the lenders they work with 
have little incentive to check the validity of those appraisals. 
To mitigate this conflict of interest, appraisers should not be directly 
hired or controlled by the loan officers or underwriters looking to get a 
loan closed.  However, despite guidelines regarding appraiser 
independence, many banks have allowed their loan officers or underwriters 
to “manage the entire appraisal process from order to review,” which some 
appraisers view as a prime cause for “the intense pressure on 
appraisers.”151  
On a widespread basis, appraisers have been notified of the amount of 
the appraisal they were expected to meet in order to justify the loan 
amount, and appraisers that failed to meet this appraisal amount could 
expect to lose business.152 Appraisers who refused to doctor their reports 
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have been threatened to be put on a “blacklist” of appraisers excluded from 
work.153  In 2001, a worldwide association of appraisers, the Appraisal 
Institute, informed Congress that its members were facing increasing 
pressures to inflate property appraisals, and a director at that institute stated 
that the pressure became even more intense during the early and mid-
2000s.154  One 2006 survey indicated that ninety percent of appraisers 
reported that they had been pressured to inflate the value of real estate, up 
from fifty-five percent in the previous 2003 survey.155  In a review of a 
small sample of 2006 loans where there was an early default, despite the 
fact that many had strong credit characteristics, a rating agency discovered 
that more than half had appraisal problems, such as inaccurate appraisals, 
conflicting information, or items “outside of typically accepted 
parameters.”156 
There is too little regulation of appraisers.  The Appraisal 
Subcommittee, an independent federal agency designed to ensure that 
states enforce rules governing appraisers, has no enforcement powers other 
than one it will not use, “non-recognition,” meaning that all appraisers in 
that state would be banned from any transactions involving a federal 
agency.  The Appraisal Subcommittee reported in 2006 that 60 percent of 
the state agencies regulating appraisals did not uphold their enforcement 
responsibilities.157  As a result, many state investigations against 
appraisers, some involving fraud, lie dormant for years.158  
C.  Occupancy and Property Ownership Misrepresentation 
Lenders should naturally be interested in whether borrowers live or 
will live in the property secured by a loan, as subprime default rates are 
higher where the owner does not occupy the house.159  Borrowers not 
living in the property have less incentive to maintain loan payments if the 
value of the property drops below the amount of the loan, especially if they 
are attempting to “flip” the property for a profit.160  A significant 
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component of the rise in recent defaults has been the number of borrowers 
who were speculating on housing value increases, hoping to flip properties 
for a profit.  Borrowers’ credit can look better if they hide the fact that they 
own several other properties and so have a debt load larger than their 
income can maintain.161  Therefore, misrepresenting that they will live in 
the house subject to the mortgage will make the loan seem more secure 
than it is.  A rating agency review of a small sample of 2006 loans with 
early payment default found that 66% of the loans had some form of 
“occupancy fraud.”162  
D.  FICO Score Problems 
With the advent of securitization, credit scores assumed increasing and 
even dominant importance, as they and loan-to-value ratios are the most 
salient objective pieces of information that can be verified and relied on by 
the secondary market.  Economists attempting to discern whether 
underwriting standards fell also rely on FICO scores to examine 
underwriting standards.  However, FICO scores have not been a stable 
indication of the likelihood of subprime mortgage default, and high FICO 
scores in particular have become less reliable.  The delinquency rate of 
subprime borrowers with high FICO scores increased more than those with 
low FICO scores between 2005 and 2007.  The serious delinquency rate of 
borrowers with FICO scores between 500 and 600 doubled from 2005 to 
2007, but almost quadrupled for subprime borrowers with FICO scores 
above 700.  In fact, the rate of serious delinquency for the best-FICO group 
in 2007 was almost as high as the worst FICO group in 2005.163  There is 
additional anecdotal evidence and industry sentiment that credit scores 
were not a stable indicator of borrower credit-worthiness from one 
borrower to the next, or from one year to the next.164   
One problem with credit scores is that whether borrowers with a 
particular credit score are likely to default depends to a large extent on 
factors other than the credit score.  For example, a study conducted by Fair 
Isaac along with a bond rating agency found that borrowers with high 
credit scores who put no money down are as likely to default as borrowers 
who score lower but make a forty percent down payment.  Even portfolios 
with identical FICO scores can vary dramatically in their default rates, 
depending on the strength of underwriting conducted by the originators.165 
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Credit scores also are designed to predict behavior for a two-year 
period and are not as effective for predicting behavior for longer periods, a 
significant problem for home loans.166  Investors and rating agencies that 
designed default models in an era of low securitization are likely to find 
that their models under-predict for defaults once securitization increases, 
and this effect appears to be much stronger for borrowers with low credit 
scores and low documentation of loans.167  There has been a decline in the 
predictive powers of credit ratings for important aspects of 
creditworthiness.  For example, one rating agency found that loans that 
defaulted early in 2003 had on average a thirty point lower FICO score 
than those that did not.  By 2006, this spread had decreased to ten points.  
The same study found that loans with early payment defaults in 2006 had 
FICO scores on average thirty points higher than similar loans from 
2003.168 
Some have asserted that FICO scores became inflated during the 
subprime boom.169  Also, there has been significant effort by some 
consumers to game the credit scoring system in order to obtain inflated 
credit scores.  For example, internet based companies have claimed the 
ability to increase a borrower’s credit score artificially, through several 
methods.  A common claim has been that, for a fee, companies would list 
borrowers as an “authorized user” for existing credit cards of third parties 
with high credit scores.  Companies claim that they can increase 
borrowers’ credit scores by 50 to 250 points or more with this method.170  
One rating agency, in reviewing loans for borrowers with FICO scores of 
686, found that sixteen percent of the borrowers had employed the 
“authorized user” tool.171  In analyzing a sample of loans with early 
payment default, a rating agency found that the “loan files of borrowers 
with very high FICO scores showed little evidence of a sound credit 
history but rather the borrowers appeared as ‘authorized’ users of someone 
else’s credit.”172  Other schemes abound.  One company claims that it can 
increase credit scores by adding new borrowers’ names to dormant, paid-
off loans in a third party’s name, so that the new borrowers are given credit 
for the paid off loan.173  Another tactic is for a “credit doctor” to issue a 
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credit account to potential borrowers, with a high credit limit but low credit 
balance, but at the same time prevent the potential borrower from using the 
credit.  In that way, credit agencies perceive that borrowers have a low 
balance to credit limit ratio.174 
Lenders also weakened the effect of FICO scores by failing to conduct 
due diligence in the face of information that should have led them to 
question those scores.  For example, there often was no investigation of 
derogatories that appeared on credit reports, or even of fraud alerts.  
Lenders did not follow up where there was evidence that a borrower was 
using or had used an alias or the wrong social security number.175 
E.  Underwriting for Teaser Rate 
A significant failure in underwriting was lenders’ willingness to 
underwrite loans for the teaser rate in 2/28s or 3/27s or payment option 
loans, even though the borrower would quickly finish the teaser portion of 
the loan and have to pay the full amount.176  Failing to underwrite for the 
full amount set up borrowers for payment reset shock, as they would not 
have enough income to make their payments.177  Furthermore, 
underwriting for the teaser rate enabled lenders to trick borrowers into 
taking out loans that they could not afford, as the lender or broker would 
attempt to convince the borrower that the teaser rate was the full, fixed rate 
for the loan.  Many borrowers have been surprised when the fixed portion 
of their hybrid ARM ended, as they were led to believe that they had 
secured a fixed rate loan. 
Failing to underwrite for the fully amortized rate allowed lenders to 
deceive both ends of the mortgage chain, to the lenders’ advantage.  They 
could convince borrowers to take out loans that the borrowers ultimately 
could not afford, by convincing borrowers that the initial teaser rate was 
the only rate about which the borrowers had to worry.  And the lenders 
could deceive investors by failing to adequately inform them that the loans 
had been underwritten only to the teaser amount, concealing from investors 
the increased likelihood of default that the hybrid ARMs held. 
F.  “Risk Layering” 
Originators added to their underwriting problems by engaging in “risk 
layering,” where they would allow a single loan to have multiple risky 
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attributes.178  A single loan might have low documentation and a 
simultaneous second lien, be made to a first-time home buyer with a low 
FICO score, and allow for negative amortization.  Risk layering increased 
between 2001 and 2006: “In particular, loans with incomplete 
documentation and high leverage had an especially notable rise, increasing 
from essentially zero in 2001 to almost 20 percent of subprime originations 
by the end of 2006.”179  Each of these risks by itself may be somewhat 
difficult to quantify.  However, the layering of such multiple risks makes 
the analysis of risk that much more difficult.  There has been little history 
of default outcomes for this layering of risk, and at best underwriters could 
only guess at the effect of such multiple risk elements.  As an analyst from 
a rating agency noted, “This ‘perfect storm’ of risk layering in 
underwriting subprime mortgages is unprecedented.”180 
VIII.  SECURITIZATION’S EFFECTS ON ORIGINATORS 
Many have pointed to the “originate to distribute” model of lending as 
a primary cause of the subprime meltdown.181  Under this critique, 
originators that are able to pass off the risk of default to investors by 
securitizing loans cease to screen effectively for that risk, since they no 
longer bear it.  Lenders would be unwilling to spend money for screening 
that does not benefit them unless forced to do so by the purchasers of 
loans.  Because the secondary market can only verify hard information, 
lenders give up soft mortgage underwriting and focus almost exclusively 
on the hard numbers, such as FICO scores and LTV ratios, that can be 
verified by the secondary market. 
Lenders were often supposed to retain some residual risk by owning 
the most junior classes of securities (often unrated) created by securitizing 
their loans.  In this way it was thought lenders would have an interest in 
loan quality since their interests would be wiped out first by loan defaults.  
However, once lenders found that hedge funds and securitizers of CDOs 
were willing to buy these junior tranches, they could escape even this 
residual risk and dramatically increase the moral hazard that investors 
faced.182 
Securitization also affects subprime lenders in other significant ways.  
The source of funding that securitization provides—money from investors 
in capital markets—is much less stable than other sources of funds used for 
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lending.  Financial institutions that lend out money received from 
depositors have a fairly stable supply of money, so long as the depositors 
stay with the bank and there is no run on the bank—a hazard normally 
prevented by deposit insurance—and so long as the Fed keeps its interest 
rates below any mandated ceilings on deposit rates.183  Depository 
institutions may have trouble retaining deposits when interest rates peak, as 
investors may remove their funds to place them in higher interest assets 
unless the depository institution raises its rates.  This can be problematic 
for banks that have lent their deposits out for long-term fixed rate loans.  
However, banks have controlled this problem to some extent by switching 
to adjustable rate mortgages for their borrowers, so that their loan rates 
increase along with their deposit rates as interest rates generally rise.184  
Relying on deposits for their liquidity has also prevented banks from 
growing rapidly and, along with the Fed monetary policy, has traditionally 
acted as a damper on runaway speculative real estate booms.185 
Non-depository subprime lenders traditionally had greater difficulty in 
obtaining funds than banks, and therefore had stability of a different kind, 
in that while they often had little money to lend, they almost never had 
access to enormous sums.  Before securitization, subprime lenders often 
had more potential borrowers than they had funds to lend, and had to work 
to find buyers for their loans.  One subprime lender, for example, sold its 
loans individually to doctors and dentists as investments.186  
With securitization, however, subprime lenders found that they could 
attach themselves to a great spigot of funds, one that seemed almost 
endless during boom times, but one that they knew could be switched off at 
any time.  As subprime lenders found out during the late 1990s, external 
market shocks could cut off their access to capital markets and prevent 
them from securitizing their loans, cutting off their source of funding.187   
A substantial portion of subprime lenders originated in the same area, 
in or around Orange County, California, and many subprime executives 
had worked together at earlier subprime lenders stretching back into the 
1990s.188  From this experience, the principals who managed subprime 
lenders learned two primary lessons, one cautionary, the other the opposite 
of cautionary.  The cautionary lesson subprime lenders learned is how 
quickly the spigot of subprime lending could be turned off, even for 
reasons having nothing to do with the lender itself.  In 1998, the Russian 
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debt crisis, along with the related collapse of the private hedge fund, Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM), caused investors to engage in a rush 
to safety, abandoning securities issued by subprime lenders for the haven 
of U.S. Treasury securities.189  While subprime lenders had also suffered 
unexpectedly high prepayment rates, and lenders had been playing 
accounting games by accounting for gains they had not yet realized, the 
investors seem to have been acting to a significant extent for reasons 
external to the subprime market.190  With less investment interest in 
subprime-backed securities, subprime lenders’ cost of funds increased, and 
they received less money for loans already in the pipeline, dealing them a 
double blow.191  Lenders had also tried to hedge against falling interest 
rates through Treasury bills, but with the flight to quality, the value of 
Treasury bills increased.192  Wall Street firms rethought their loans to the 
subprime lenders.193  The stock values of subprime lenders plummeted, 
with some dropping to zero.194  The market was littered with fallen 
subprime lenders that had depended on securitization, including many of 
the biggest names in subprime.195   
Managers of subprime lenders learned how easily and quickly their 
access to funds could be cut and their businesses could go under if they 
depended on securitization, even if they attempted to make good loans.  
The subprime loan business is not just subject to normal business cycles 
when built on securitization.  Securitization exaggerates subprime business 
cycles and turns what might be relatively minor downturns into busts.  
Subprime lenders that “suffer even modest losses . . . may trip financial 
triggers in their warehouse borrowing documents (or other financial 
contracts) that, if not waived, might cause other contracts to cross-default, 
leading to the potential of being unable to continue in business.”196  
The second lesson subprime originators learned came from the 
example set by First Alliance (FAMCO), a subprime mortgage giant 
headquartered in Orange County that in the late 1990s symbolized abusive 
lending practices.  FAMCO was founded in 1971 by Brian Chisick and his 
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wife, Sarah, and for many years was a small consumer finance lender.197  
In the early years, for FAMCO to sell its loans, Chisick had to buy lists of 
potential investors, and then call them each individually to try to persuade 
them to purchase the loans.198  FAMCO began securitizing loans in 1992, 
and this access to the capital markets for funding changed and expanded 
the company dramatically.  In one year, its origination quadrupled, from 
$100 million to $400 million.199  FAMCO’s retail loan origination 
increased rapidly at thirty-one percent per annum, so that by 1997 what 
had once been a small consumer finance company had originated over $1 
billion in residential loans.200  The Chisicks’ wealth increased dramatically 
as well,201 and in 1996 the Chisicks reportedly sold $135 million in 
stock.202  
While it expanded, FAMCO was widely accused of misrepresenting 
the amount of fees that it would charge borrowers and the amounts of the 
loans that would encumber their houses.  Using its allegedly deceptive 
methods, FAMCO was able to charge loan fees of up to twenty-three 
percent, much higher than the industry standard five percent, and it 
charged high fees whether borrowers had good or bad credit.203  A Florida 
assistant attorney general noted that FAMCO’s fees were “just so 
excessively high that it’s hard for me to conceive of any way a consumer 
would agree to that kind of loan if all the facts have been put before 
them.”204   
As a result of its lending practices, FAMCO became one of the most 
vilified and investigated subprime lenders of its day.  It became the target 
of investigations by the U.S. Justice Department as well as by seven states’ 
attorneys general.  There were also numerous class actions and civil 
lawsuits brought, including those filed by the states of Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, and Illinois, alleging borrower deception.205 
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Despite these lawsuits and investigations, FAMCO forged ahead.  It 
continued to securitize its loans and managed to have some of the 
securities backed by AAA-rated loans.  Only after an investigatory report 
in the New York Times and ABC’s 20/20 revealed FAMCO’s abusive 
lending to the general public and to the plaintiffs’ bar at large did FAMCO 
declare bankruptcy.  Six months after FAMCO declared bankruptcy, the 
Federal Trade Commission sued FAMCO and the Chisicks based on 
allegations that they had violated both federal and state laws in their 
lending operations from 1992 to 2000.206 
The bankruptcy process, however, was good to FAMCO’s founders.  
With the cases against it consolidated, FAMCO and its founders were able 
to enter into one global settlement, with the Chisicks paying $20 million 
and an additional $55 million coming from FAMCO.207  The Chisicks 
could well afford their share as Mr. Chisick had reportedly received over 
$100 million over four years in total compensation, including stock sales, 
from FAMCO.208  The investors in FAMCO’s abusive loans paid nothing.  
The Chisicks emerged from the settlement with enough money to purchase 
the residual income stream flowing from some of FAMCO’s loans for 
about $25 million.209  
Lehman Brothers, an investment house, was also sued for providing a 
warehouse line of credit and for participating in securitizing FAMCO’s 
loans.  The suit against Lehman was closely watched to see if secondary 
market participants could be held liable for enabling subprime lenders’ 
abusive lending.  At the trial court, Lehman was held liable, though the 
jury found that it was only ten percent liable for the damage caused by 
FAMCO, and so found damages of only $5.1 million against Lehman.210  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, vacated the damages award 
and “remand[ed] for further proceedings on the proper calculation of ‘out-
of-pocket’ damages caused by First Alliance’s fraudulent lending scheme, 
to be proportionately attributed to Lehman [Brothers].”211 Lehman also 
settled a case that had been filed against it by the State of Florida for only 
$400,000. 
FAMCO’s demise should have been a model “worst case scenario” for 
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abusive subprime lenders, the investment houses that securitized their 
loans, and the investors who purchased the loans.  With numerous victims, 
the Justice Department, and a number of attorneys general breathing down 
FAMCO’s neck, multiple class action claims filed against it, and many 
private suits stacked on top of them, FAMCO, its owners, and its enablers 
should have paid heavily for FAMCO’s misdeeds.  What the subprime 
industry, investment houses, and investors discovered instead is that the 
worst case subprime scenario was not bad at all; the Chisicks emerged 
wealthy and free from prosecution, the investment house received a mere 
slap on the wrist, and the investors in the abusive loans got off virtually 
scot-free.  
There were some larger settlements against subprime lenders, such as a 
Household Finance settlement in 2002 for $484 million and a settlement by 
Ameriquest for $325 million in 2006.212  Unfortunately, these were not 
sufficient, and, in the case of Ameriquest, were too late in the day to 
dissuade subprime lenders from engaging in abusive lending. 
IX.  SECURITIZATION’S EFFECT ON RATING AGENCIES AND  
INVESTMENT BANKS 
The reputations of rating agencies and investment houses have suffered 
a tremendous blow as a result of the subprime meltdown.  This loss of 
confidence occurred when many investors realized that they could no 
longer trust the ratings of the subprime backed securities that were being 
offered or the CDOs whose value depended on those securities, and when 
they recognized that investment houses packaged those loans without 
adequately protecting investors.  The primary purpose of rating agencies is 
to assess the likelihood of timely payments to owners of securities, with a 
higher rating signaling a lower credit risk for those securities.213  It 
appeared that rating agencies had dramatically underestimated the 
likelihood of default for pools of subprime loans, and the risk of loss in the 
resulting RMB and CDO securities.  While rating agencies claim to be 
victims of misrepresentations by borrowers, bad underwriting, and flawed 
reporting by originators, their missteps and poor rating work can be 
attributed directly to the incentives rating agencies themselves had to 
overrate securities backed by subprime loans, incentives provided through 
the securitization process.  Ratings agencies have not, until recently, been 
regulated in any significant way in the United States or any other nation 
that is a major financial center.214 
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Rating agencies were necessary in the subprime market because of the 
securitization process and because the ultimate investors in the securities 
backed by subprime loans needed a trusted intermediary to provide 
evidence of value, given both the complexity of the securities and the 
difficulty in tracking information regarding the borrowers and securities 
represented by the myriad loans in the mortgage pools.  For example, a 
single pool of loans might contain anywhere from one thousand to twenty-
five thousand loans, depending on the type of loan pooled.215  Also, 
investors were typically not given the loan-by-loan data they needed to 
fully evaluate the loans and resulting securities.216  However, securitization 
also provided the means by which loan originators could induce rating 
agencies to overrate subprime loans, and the incentives for rating agencies 
to succumb to that inducement. 
Rating agencies had an inherent conflict of interest in that, by and 
large, they were paid by the securities issuers that they were supposed to 
police rather than by the investors they were supposed to protect.217  Worse 
yet, the issuers of securities could shop among the different rating agencies 
for the best set of ratings for tranches of securities for a given loan, and if a 
rating agency consistently provided better ratings than its competitors, it 
could gain valuable business.  This resulted in a “race to the bottom” 
among the rating agencies on the stringency of their ratings.218  Just as 
mortgage brokers were enticed to push loan amounts to the top margin of 
what automated underwriting programs would allow, so too lenders made 
more money if they pushed rating agencies to the bottom margins of what 
loan quality the raters would allow. 
The greater the proportion of an offerings’ securities a rating agency 
was willing to rate AAA, the more valuable those securities were, because 
investors would be willing to accept a lower level of return for more risk-
free securities, in effect paying more for the higher rating.219  Not only did 
issuers and underwriters shop for the best ratings, they also were not 
willing to pay for ratings not to their liking.220  Rating agencies found that 
the market not only did not reward high quality ratings, but instead 
punished them.  As one rating agency internal memo stated, “The real 
problem is not that the market . . . underweights ratings quality but rather 
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that, in some sectors, it actually penalizes quality by awarding rating 
mandates based on the lowest credit enhancement needed for the highest 
rating.”221   
Credit enhancements, efforts to reduce risk to investors, can be 
expensive, as they can include “loan guarantees from an insurance 
company or similar guarantor” or “overcollateralization”, where greater 
value of loans is put into the loan pool than is strictly necessary for the 
required income stream.222  Rating agencies claimed to require credit 
enhancements designed to protect investors in the top rated securities even 
if there were catastrophic losses on the order of those that would occur 
with a return to the Great Depression.223  However, such claims were 
clearly exaggerated. 
Issuers consulted rating agencies in creating the tranches of securities 
to be rated and issued, and the rating agencies advised on what credit 
enhancement or equity cushion would need to be included in order for the 
issuer to receive the desired ratings.  Because issuers shopped for the 
highest ratings at the lowest cost, rating agencies that recommended the 
least expensive credit enhancement received the most business.  This 
encouraged credit agencies to minimize the amount of required credit 
enhancement, perhaps justifying that decision with the short history of 
stability in the credit market.224 
Issuers, however, went beyond mere shopping for better ratings.  By 
complaining, large originators could reportedly induce rating agencies to 
increase ratings after they had rated an offering of subprime backed 
securities, even though the rating agency received no new information to 
justify a new rating.  This indicates that the rating was based at least in part 
on demands by originators rather than solely on the quality of the loans 
securitized.225 
That rating agencies were willing to rate securities backed by exotic 
loan products to begin with shows how willing rating agencies were to 
sacrifice rating quality in order to earn market share.  A prime element of 
rating a security should be how well such a security has performed 
historically given various market conditions.  However, rating agencies 
were willing to rate securities made up of new loan products for which 
there was no real historical record of default rates, and what little record 
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there was occurred during a period of growing housing prices with few 
defaults.226  While there is significant academic research about default 
causation for more traditional products, only in the last year or two have 
economists turned significant attention to the default characteristics of the 
exotic loans that came to dominate the subprime market.227  Rating 
agencies should have acted as a necessary brake on the development of 
potentially risky mortgage products by refusing to rate them until they had 
demonstrated a track record showing that the likelihood of default was not 
excessive.  Instead, rating agencies threw open the doors of securitization 
to these new loans with many layers of risk, and thereby supercharged their 
use by residential borrowers. 
While rating agencies were pressured to lower the quality of their 
ratings, they in turn pressured state governments to lower the quality of 
consumer protection to be given borrowers.  For example, when the State 
of Georgia enacted strong consumer protection of borrowers, including 
assignee liability, the rating agencies indicated to the Georgia legislature 
that they would not rate transactions subject to the law, thereby 
browbeating Georgia into amending that law.228  The rating agencies each 
issued reports detailing their criteria by which to rate transactions in the 
face of state anti-predatory lending laws, essentially attempting to create a 
ceiling for such borrower protection.229 
Rating agencies made clear to investors that they did not perform due 
diligence or otherwise verify whether the loan data they relied on was 
accurate.230  However, the rating agencies did not inform investors of all of 
the rating criteria used to rate RMBS and CDOs.231  Rating agencies also 
frequently tweaked the results of their loss models and substituted another 
loss level without a documented explanation.  For example, one rating 
agency “regularly reduced loss expectations on subprime second lien 
mortgages from the loss expectations output by its RMBS model.”232 
Rating RMBS and CDOs was incredibly profitable for rating agencies.  
A rating agency could demand and receive $200,000 to $250,000 for its 
work rating a $350 million mortgage pool, even though it might receive 
only $50,000 to rate a similarly sized municipal bond.233  One rating 
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agency alone reportedly took in about $3 billion for its rating of loan and 
other debt pools from 2002 through 2006, and revenue of such structured 
finance rating made up almost half of its revenue for 2006.234  Rating 
agencies had extremely high profit margins, in some cases more than fifty 
percent.235   
As a result of the competition in a tremendously profitable business, 
rating agencies underrated the risk of loss and default of the RMBS and 
CDOs they were rating.  As one insider noted, their model did not capture 
half of the risk of a certain issuance, but they would rate it anyway, stating 
that the issuance “could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”236 
Rating agencies should have been constantly updating their default and 
prepayment models to reflect the new mortgage products and new 
conditions underlying the subprime market.  However, because updating 
these models is an expensive process and rating agencies were increasingly 
focused on the bottom line, such updating could fall through the cracks.  
One former managing director of a rating agency reported in 2008 that his 
rating agency’s last loss and default model update was implemented in late 
1998 or early 1999, and that a subsequent, more powerful model was never 
implemented, to his knowledge, for budgetary reasons.237 
Rating agencies also failed to re-rate past securities issues on a timely 
basis.  Had they done so, the agencies and investors might have more 
quickly become aware of the decline in underwriting taking over the 
subprime market.238  However, because re-rating of securities was typically 
paid for up-front by the issuer, and because issuers were rarely eager to see 
the downgrades that regular re-rating might provide, ratings were normally 
not downgraded until well after investors could see that the ratings were 
too high.239  By comparison, rating agencies seemed more eager to re-rate 
when they could upgrade ratings.  For example, in 2006, one rating agency 
reported that it upgraded its structured finance ratings 4.54 times as often 
as it downgraded them.240   
Rating agencies were late to admit the severity of the default problem.  
As late as June 2007, one rating agency report stated that the mortgage 
“industry as a whole will be able to manage this more difficult operating 
environment over the intermediate term without ratings implications, 
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although some companies may be better situated than others.”241  At the 
time, subprime loans comprised forty percent of all loans overdue or in 
foreclosure.242  In 2007, rating agencies were finally forced to admit that 
their ratings for securities backed by subprime mortgage were too high.  
One rating agency reported that in 2007 it downgraded the ratings of about 
thirty percent of rated subprime mortgage-backed securities and nineteen 
percent of rated CDOs, and it issued more RMBS downgrades than it had 
in the previous ten years combined.243 
Rating agencies could have insisted on being given the “due diligence” 
reports generated for the investment houses issuing securities, and then 
used the reports in their ratings.  Instead, they did not request these easily 
obtainable reports and so failed to gain important information that could 
have made the rating process more accurate.244 
Just as rating agencies were being pressured to reduce the quality of 
their ratings, so too were investment houses being pushed, perhaps 
willingly, to securitize loans with decreasing quality, without effectively 
alerting investors as to the decline in quality.  One way that investment 
houses concealed the decline in quality, even from themselves, was by 
reducing the amount of due diligence done on their behalf in the 
examination of loan pools.  Due diligence, which was conducted by 
separate specialty companies, was designed to ferret out loans that did not 
conform to the underwriting standards loan originators claimed to be using, 
failed to comply with applicable law, or had other problems with 
documentation.245  Loans with problems could be kicked back to the 
lenders, who might be forced to sell the loans for a discount, depending on 
the problem with the loan.246  Lenders disliked these kickbacks, which 
could cut significantly into their profitability, and so fought against them. 
Shortly after 2000, a securities company might have ordered the 
review of twenty-five to forty percent of subprime loans to be assembled in 
a loan pool.247  By 2006, Wall Street firms had relaxed this due diligence 
considerably, and typically only ten percent of such loans were 
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reviewed.248  This lax diligence was confined to investment firms intent on 
securitizing the loans, however, and loan buyers who intended to retain the 
loans in their portfolios would normally have fifty to one hundred percent 
of such loans reviewed.249  Worse yet, the companies accused of 
performing the due diligence for Wall Street firms have themselves been 
accused of throwing away troublesome documents or changing 
documentation to hide difficult loans.250 
There was regular pressure by lenders on investment houses to 
decrease the amount of due diligence investment houses conducted on the 
loans they purchased and securitized.251  Larger subprime lenders had a 
strong enough bargaining position with Wall Street that they could bargain 
down the due diligence of Wall Street firms.252  Some subprime originators 
had so many Wall Street firms interested in acquiring their loans that they 
could insist that would-be purchasers agree to review only a fraction of the 
loans.253  Investment houses could have improved the work of rating 
agencies by consistently passing along to them the results of their due 
diligence efforts, but they failed to do so, and the rating agencies seem 
rarely to have requested them.254 
X.  HOW INVESTORS FAILED 
The last line of defense against declining underwriting standards 
should have been those most affected by it after the subprime borrowers: 
the ultimate investors in the resulting loans.  Many of these investors were 
highly sophisticated entities, and so the question arises why many of them 
continued to purchase securitized interests in loans that were dropping in 
quality.  Investors acting rationally in their own self-interest should have 
been very concerned about the underwriting standards for loans that they 
purchased interests in, given that those underwriting standards are designed 
to regulate the default rates of the loans, and hence their profitability.  
Investors should have known that subprime loans were risky and that the 
subprime market was the breeding ground for abusive lending.  Predatory 
lending had long been the subject of newspaper articles, regulatory 
investigation, and Congressional testimony.  Still, investors seemed to 
swarm over securities backed by subprime loans, and there was often 
substantially more demand than availability for securities backed by 
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subprime loans.255 
Investors were drawn to securities backed by subprime loans in large 
part because of the greater returns of these securities compared to other 
equally rated securities.256  Many institutional investors, including pension 
funds, can only purchase AAA-rated or investment grade assets, giving the 
value of such highly rated securities a rating premium.257  Securities 
backed by subprime loans also made up a significant and growing 
proportion of assets used to create structured finance (SF) collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs).  Of those SF CDOs that closed during the first 
six months of 2006, there was a sixty-four percent concentration in U.S. 
subprime-mortgage backed securities, an increase from the forty-eight 
percent concentration that was found during the first six months of the 
previous year.258  Investors were lured by the higher returns that CDOs 
offered compared to government or corporate bonds, especially pension 
funds, which needed higher yields to keep up with their obligations.259  
Issuance of CDOs soared, growing from almost zero in 1995 to more than 
$500 billion in 2006, with 2006 issuance about equal to the total of the 
three preceding years combined.260   
In what seems an amazing statement given the subsequent subprime 
collapse, one rating agency noted the reasons for CDO concentration on 
subprime RMBS: “Subprime RMBS have remained a large component of 
SF CDO collateral for their relatively stable performance, strong issuance 
supply and attractive spreads compared with alternative SF investments 
such as credit cards, auto loans, commercial mortgage backed securities 
and prime RMBS.”261  The popularity of CDOs purchasing subprime 
backed securities propped up the values of those securities.  As Wachter, 
Pavlov, and Pozsar note, “The CDO market was so strong, in fact, that it 
ended up driving demand for underlying mortgages in and of themselves.  
Consequently, prices of MBSs and mortgage loans remained extremely 
buoyant, cheating investors into a false sense of security, as underwriting 
standards were collapsing.”262 
Much of the RMBS packaged in CDOs were less than AAA-rated, 
however, which made the CDO structure unstable.  It is estimated that in 
2006, seventy to seventy-five percent of the RMBS held in CDOs were 
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rated below AAA.263  Therefore, significant defaults in RMBS, by hitting 
the junior tranches of RMBS, would have a disastrous effect on the values 
of these CDOs; this effect would reverberate through the subprime 
industry, as CDOs were keeping up market prices for RMBS to a 
significant extent.   
The fact that so many of the subprime mortgages were repackaged in 
CDOs made it that much more difficult, if not impossible, for investors or 
rating agencies to track back to the underwriting of the loans that 
ultimately provided the value for the CDO securities.  Instead of a package 
of loans that investors could conceivably examine, they instead had a 
package of securities each backed by a set of tranches of different pools of 
loans.  Determining how much risk each loan provided and then how much 
interest the investor had in each loan would be a computational nightmare 
and likely impossible.264  As a result, many investors did not even do 
independent analysis or their own due diligence, but instead relied on the 
rating agencies’ analysis.265  “[M]any investors, swept up in the euphoria 
of the moment, failed to pay close attention to what they were buying.”266  
Investors often had to make rapid decisions in order to purchase securities 
that were in such high demand, further discouraging them from engaging 
in extensive due diligence of their own.267 
Investment houses should have been disclosing to investors the 
information that investors needed to rationally decide whether and on what 
terms to purchase the subprime mortgage backed securities.  However, the 
disclosure given to investors fell far short of what it should have been.  Not 
only did investment houses fail to report the results of their due diligence 
efforts to rating agencies, they also failed to report an accurate number of 
loans that were shoe-horned into loan pools by the use of exceptions—
loans that did not fit the stated underwriting criteria of the loan 
originator.268  For example, one mortgage lender regularly used exceptions 
to increase borrowers’ credit limits by fifteen percent more than its own 
underwriting criteria would have allowed.269  Instead of disclosing to 
investors how many loans were made pursuant to such exceptions, the 
prospectuses filed by investment banks typically used boiler-plate 
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language, such as that exceptions accounted for “substantial” or 
“significant” portions of the loans.270  Nor did they disclose whether the 
use of exceptions was increasing, which it appears to have been at least 
since 2005.271  While investment houses could have kicked back 
exceptions and forced originators to hold them in their portfolios, it 
appears that instead they may have purchased them at a discount and then 
included them in loan pools without fully notifying investors of the 
resulting decrease in the quality of the pool.272  If so, this would be a 
profitable exercise for investment houses, because they would be able to 
sell bargain loans at full price.  In some loan portfolios, exceptions have 
been estimated to make up fifty to eighty percent of the portfolio.273 
The disclosures given to investors were inadequate given the 
complexity of those risks.274  To analyze the pool of loans, investors 
needed loan level detail regarding that pool, something they were rarely 
given.  They should have been provided documentation regarding the due 
diligence performed by investment houses, which was also withheld from 
them.  Additionally, investors should have been given the underwriting 
standards that were applied to the loans in the mortgage pool, the number 
of loans that were granted an exception from those standards, and also the 
policies that governed those exceptions.  Investors may have been 
informed of the number of stated income loans in a pool, but typically they 
were not told that the character of the borrowers receiving stated income 
loans was changing, as those loans were being marketed to W-2 wage 
earners rather than the traditional wealthier borrowers who had received 
them in the past.275  Investors were not always adequately informed about 
borrowers’ combined loan-to-value ratios, given the junior liens 
encumbering borrowers’ homes, even though junior liens can significantly 
affect the default rate of senior loans, or whether the housing price 
information they were provided was based on a full appraisal or merely an 
automated appraisal.276  Investors were not given information that could 
have alerted them to the decline in underwriting that occurred in the 
subprime market in the years leading up to the subprime crisis, and so they 
kept investing in securities backed by those loans.277 
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Investors may have been comforted by the reassurance that 
securitization had built into it several protections for investors.  One of 
these protections, the holder in due course rules, cuts off many defenses 
against the loans for borrowers as soon as a loan is transferred to a bona 
fide purchaser.278  Also, investors in senior tranches may have relied on the 
junior tranches taking the first losses.  Investors were also typically 
protected by credit enhancements, such as overcollateralization or default 
insurance, provided to secure ratings, on the spread of risk among an entire 
pool of loans.  Other safeguards built into securitization that supposedly 
reduced risk to investors included diversification in the loan pool regarding 
where the loans were originated, their credit risk or other characteristics, as 
well as deal provisions requiring originators to repurchase early defaults, 
make other representations and warranties, retain servicing rights, etc.279   
Despite these protections, many investors—ironically like the 
subprime borrowers they hoped to profit from—were burned by engaging 
in financial transactions too risky and difficult to understand.  
Securitization took exotic subprime loans that are too unstable and 
complex for many borrowers to understand or use safely, and  packaged 
these loans into securities that are, by their structure, excessively unstable 
and complex for most investors, multiplying the risk at both ends. 
Investors, like the borrowers, found that the disclosures given to them were 
inadequate to disclose those risks.  
XI.  PROFITABLE FAILURES 
We are reaching the final chapter of the current round of subprime 
securitization.  The Federal Reserve Board has finally issued rules 
mandating a few minimum underwriting standards for higher priced loans, 
requiring lenders to assess the borrowers’ ability to repay such loans based 
on the highest scheduled payment during the loans’ first seven years, as 
well as to verify income and assets, among other protections.  All lenders 
are barred from pressuring appraisers to misstate home values.280  While 
these rules are a belated improvement, so far investors appear to consider 
them inadequate to protect them from faulty underwriting in the subprime 
market.  Private label subprime securitization itself has largely shut down, 
and most originators have gone bankrupt or been closed by their parent 
organizations.  Some argue that these bankruptcies are a form of market 
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discipline and indicate that securitization does not reward bad behavior by 
originators.  However, when the history of subprime securitization is 
written, it is important, as always, to follow the money and see how many 
fortunes were won during the subprime bubble, and what percentage of the 
winners of those fortunes were ever forced to give back any of that money 
to repay foreclosed or defrauded borrowers or duped investors.   
During the subprime bubble, many long-time subprime insiders 
became very wealthy, even while new-comers suffered losses.  How the 
long-time insiders did so can be seen in the story of one subprime lender, 
New Century Financial Corporation, headquartered, unsurprisingly, in 
Irvine, California, and which had the most noted subprime bankruptcy of 
2007.  New Century was founded in 1995 by a trio of former executives of 
another successful Orange County subprime lender.  It relied almost 
entirely on brokers to sell its loans to borrowers, with ninety percent of its 
loans coming through its broker network, as of 2004.281  New Century’s 
great innovation was a computerized fast qualification system whereby 
brokers could go online and receive loan approval in twelve seconds, a 
program so popular with brokers that, in 2003, New Century was “getting 
75% of its originations from brokers who use[d] the system.”282 
After weathering the Russian debt crisis, New Century grew quickly.  
In 2004, New Century went public and converted into a real estate 
investment trust (REIT), raising almost $800 million.283  Rather than 
securitize its own loans, New Century sold many of them through whole 
loan sales to investment banks that would securitize them.  New Century’s 
loans were so popular for Wall Street securitizers that in 2006 it sold its 
output four months in advance and claimed to have received more than two 
percent over par for them.284 
As early as 2004, New Century’s executives knew or had many 
reasons to know that the loan quality of their company was “problematic,” 
according to a bankruptcy examiner’s report, and yet New Century did 
little about the poor quality of the underwriting.285   In the first quarter of 
2004, about sixteen to twenty-one percent of loans included in an audit 
were found to have “moderate to high risk underwriting defects.”286  Later 
that year, New Century’s Quality Assurance Department stated, “[t]here 
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has been a significant spike in the high-risk defect rates in our underwriting 
audit[s] in the last several months of the year,” and by December, 
underwriting errors were reported in about twenty-four percent of the 
loans.287  Loan quality grew even worse in 2005, with much higher 
delinquency rates for many types of loans as compared to 2003 and 
2004.288  Despite this decline in loan quality, senior management barely 
discussed loan quality in any formal meetings, and the limited effort to 
improve loan underwriting was resisted by senior management.289 
The loan quality at New Century declined dramatically after 2005, 
with substantial increases in early defaults by borrowers and kickouts by 
loan purchasers, stacked on top of greater delinquency rates for 2005 and 
early 2006 New Century loans.290  While New Century did seem finally to 
make some efforts to improve loan quality in late 2006, by then it was too 
late. 
New Century continued to churn out its low quality loans, with its loan 
origination volume increasing from $14 billion in 2002 to $60 billion only 
four years later.291  Its founders became very wealthy.  In 2005 alone, each 
of the founding trio earned $1.6 million in salary plus bonuses, as well as 
over $750,000 in stock; each sold over $9.3 million in stock and earned 
millions more in dividends, with the dividends that two of the founders 
received totaling a combined $17 million, according to reports.292  New 
Century’s chairman and co-founder retired as chairman at the end of 2006, 
right before the subprime market collapsed.293  The total remuneration 
received by the three executives over a four-year period before the 
subprime meltdown was reportedly $74 million.294  In 2006, as the 
financial clouds grew darker over New Century, its three founders sold 
stock at a prolific rate, reportedly selling about $29 million in shares while 
spending about $5.4 million to buy shares at discounted rates.295   
The executives appear to claim that they were following trading plans, 
designed to allow executives to sell shares in their own companies without 
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the appearance of inside trading by engaging in regular, pre-planned sales.  
The top executives of the company, however, reportedly adopted numerous 
new trading plans followed by quick stock sales during the last year of 
New Century’s existence, and according to newspaper accounts “four 
executives sold nearly half a million shares from July to October 2006.”296  
One executive reportedly started a new trading plan in mid-November 
2006 and sold nearly $7.4 million in stock within days of adopting the new 
stock trading plan.297 
New Century’s collapse began with a February 2007 SEC filing in 
which the company said that the statements for three of the quarters in 
2006 had to be restated because of failure to account properly for 
problematic loans; they later admitted to broader accounting 
irregularities.298  In March 2007, New Century reported that it expected it 
would report a loss for the entire year of 2006, in part because of loan loss 
reserves for which it should have accounted.299 All of New Century’s 
warehouse lenders withdrew their funding or announced plans to do so.300  
Purchasers of loans were demanding that New Century buy back $9 billion 
in its own loans.301  Faced with repurchase demands it could not satisfy and 
the pulling of its warehouse funding, New Century declared bankruptcy in 
April 2007.302  As of September 2008, the FBI was reportedly investigating 
New Century,303 and in October 2008, a grand jury was investigating New 
Century and two other subprime lenders to see if mortgage fraud or other 
white-collar crimes had been committed.304   
There is no doubt that in the insular world of Orange County subprime 
lenders the New Century founders were intimately familiar with the 
profitable fate of the owners of FAMCO, the most notorious predatory 
lender of the previous decade.  As long as their loans were somewhat less 
predatory and somewhat less abusive than FAMCO’s, the New Century 
principals had good reason to believe that, regardless of how shoddy their 
company’s loan underwriting became and how many of their loans went 
into default and foreclosure, they could escape prosecution and retire with 
their wealth intact.  New Century’s loans reportedly “have some of the 
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highest default rates in the industry -- almost twice those of competitors 
like Wells Fargo and Ameriquest, according to data from Moody's 
Investors Service.”305   
The New Century executives made only a pittance compared to some 
of the larger players in the subprime world.  Angelo Mozilo, the CEO of 
Countrywide, which imploded as it was being taken over by Bank of 
America, reportedly cashed out $478 million in stock from Countrywide, 
while its Chief Financial Officer sold an additional $64 million in shares.306 
Roland Arnall, the founder of Ameriquest, at one time “the nation’s largest 
provider of sub-prime mortgages,” was estimated to be worth almost two 
billion dollars in 2006.307 
There is a good chance that the subprime lenders who churned out 
billions of dollars of bad loans will evade significant retribution.  While the 
FBI and at least one grand jury is probing whether subprime lenders such 
as New Century committed fraud or other crimes, there are scant resources 
for the time-intensive investigation needed to prove such white collar 
crime.308  It is difficult enough to find institutions liable for faulty 
underwriting.  Finding individual executives liable is much more difficult, 
as one must prove individual culpability and liability for corporate acts.309  
If the executives who operated New Century and the other subprime 
lenders evade significant retribution, it will be an unfortunate lesson for the 
next generation of subprime lenders, whoever they might be and whenever 
they might emerge. 
XII.  CONCLUSION 
Securitization has exposed its structural flaws in the course of the 
subprime meltdown.  It has encouraged the creation of subprime lenders 
that ran roughshod over the financial industry and borrowers alike, cutting 
corners and degrading underwriting.  Securitization made the entire 
financial system more fragile by undermining underwriting in the subprime  
and non-prime loans that coursed through the system.  In addition, it also 
not only allowed but also encouraged each step of the lending and 
securitization process to be done at the margins, at the highest level of risk 
tolerance permitted.  Securitization encouraged brokers and sales agents to 
push borrowers to borrow the maximum possible, pushing the envelope as 
to what the automated underwriting systems employed by brokers would 
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allow.  Securitization also encouraged originators, rating agencies and 
investment houses to package those loans using the smallest level of credit 
enhancements the rating agencies would allow.  By atomizing the 
mortgage process, securitization allowed originators to bargain down the 
quality standards of other market participants, including their due diligence 
in examining loans, the effectiveness of the rating agencies and the level of 
credit enhancements needed to create a large percentage of AAA-rated 
securities. 
Securitizing subprime-backed securities into CDOs encouraged rating 
agencies and investment houses again to push the envelope, creating a 
large percentage of highly rated securities out of the riskier tranches of 
subprime backed securities.   The riskier CDO tranches were again 
retranched to create new highly ranked securities.  The result was an 
enormous volume of AAA-rated securities based on risky subprime and 
non-prime loans, with level after level of guidelines pushed to their 
maximum and beyond. 
Once this house of cards was created, securitization amplified the 
effect of rising loan defaults.  Because the subprime and near prime loans 
were packaged into securities, their default had a greater effect as 
investment grade securities lost that status, greatly damaging institutions 
with investment grades “hard-coded,” requiring massive writedowns.   
Securitization allowed subprime lenders to “profitably fail,” so that 
their executives made millions originating risky loans before their 
companies folded.  The post mortem on the subprime meltdown is not a 
mere exercise.  Rules governing securitization must be designed with its 
structural flaws in mind.  Furthermore, how regulators, the courts and 
prosecutors react to the meltdown and whether lenders and subprime 
executives who acted improperly are forced to disgorge their profits is a 
crucial issue, as it will determine—at least to some extent—how market 
participants act during the next bubble. 
 
 
